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ABSTRACT
PLANNING IN ITS POLITICAL CONTEXT:
Developing Organizational Strategies for the Planning Agency
by
Daniel Stephen Greenbaum
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on August 9,
1974, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
City Planning.
Planners are trained to provide rational technical analysis of public
policy issues to guide governmental action. However, planners have often been
faced with the dilemma of having their technical analyses ignored by political
decision-makers. It is proposed here that to resolve this dilemma, planners
must seek to identify a new role for themselves which recognizes that (1) de-
spite the seeming irrationality of political decision-making which planners per-
ceive, the processes of public policy development and implementation possess
elements of a 'political rationality,' and (2) planners should seek to shape
their activities and the roles they play to complement this ongoing political
decision-making process, rather than replace it with their 'technically rational'
master planning process.
This research attempts to illustrate what type of role planners should
seek to play and how that role might be implemented. First, based on a review
of the literature on political decision-making and on planning experience, a
role concept for the planner is proposed which envisions the planner as a type
of overseer of the political decision process. In this role, the planner con-
centrates (1) on linking his or her technical knowledge to specific public de-
cisions as they emerge and (2) on ensuring that all interest groups which have
a stake in a particular decision can have their interests expressed and con-
sidered in that decision.
The research then uses this role concept as a theoretical basis for re-
solving a major question: How can a city or region develop a continuing planning
capability to carry out this role? The research focuses on the analysis of the
Metropolitan Transportation Commission in the San Francisco Bay Area. The
agency's political context is analyzed and its current organizational structure
and planning activities are reviewed. Based on this analysis, suggestions are
made for changes in the agency's organizational structure and set of planning
activities to provide improved technical guidance for the ongoing political deci-
sion processes in the region. Finally, the applicability of this approach to
developing organizational strategies for planning agencies in other metropolitan
areas, other planning disciplines and in local governments is briefly reviewed.
Thesis Supervisor: Ralph Gakenheimer
Title: Associate Professor
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: RESOLVING THE 'PLANNERS DILEMMA'
Planners are trained to provide rational, technical analysis of
public policy issues to guide governmental action. Whether the issue is in
land use, health ,transportation or any of a number of other fields, the
planner attempts to apply a range of analytic tools to help political decision
makers consider the full set of implications of their decisions. Often, those
decisions involve major change in governmental funding policies, organizational
structures or investment priorities. But they also include smaller, more
frequent decisions on zoning variances and particular construction projects.
As urban areas have grown, and the problems which those areas face
have become more complex, the planner increasingly has been brought into
urban and metropolitan institutions. To help solve the problems of these
areas, the planner has sought to apply a 'rational' process to understanding
the problems and identifying solutions for them. First, attempts were made
to identify the goals and objectives of the area in the abstract. Then,
alternative master plans for land use, transportation and other components of
the area were developed. Finally, these alternatives were evaluated
according to a number of technical criteria which sought to measure how well
the various plans met goals and objectives. The findings of these studies
were then presented to decision-makers as a basis for selecting one of the
alternatives as the official master plan for the region.
Planners were soon to find, however, that despite their warm
official welcome into the governmental decision process, politics just didn't
seem to work in the same technical and rational ways that planners worked.
In many cases, the people who engaged in political decisions were different
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in attitude, in lifestyle and in education from the planner and decisions
often ignored the technical analyses of the planners. Studies were left on
the shelf (some planners resorted to larger-than-normal size pages to ensure
that reports could not be filed away forever) and, even worse, were sometimes
used only as justification for decisions primarily based on less technical
rationales.
The planners, who had invested considerable effort and much of
their lives in their work, were faced with a serious dilemma. The means which
they had developed to analyze public problems were providing information which
was not being used to guide decisions. How were the planners to reshape their
activities and the roles they played to provide more relevant and timely
information to political decisiorimakers?
Faced with this dilemma, some planners expressed disdain for
politicians and their activities. For example, an assistant editor of
Planning magazine (an American Society of Planning Officials publication)
commented in a review of a recent book by Anthony Downs: "Our political
leaders should read it and take up his (Downs's) cause. That his proposal
would make sense even to an idiot makes it even more doubtful that Downs's
plan will be understood or implemented by our elected officials." 1 Others,
taking less extreme positions, argued that planners must seek increased
access to decision-makers (i.e., as policy advisors to chief executives and
city councils) to ensure that their analyses were heeded. 2 Still another
approach to resolving the dilemma suggested that technical changes were
necessary: planners would have to develop more sophisticated analysis tools
and broaden their concerns to include social and economic as well as physical
aspects of the urban environment. Many similar approaches have been proposed
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and, to a certain extent, they all make important contributions to identifying
problems with current planning practice.
Planners must recognize, however, that these approaches to resolving
the planner's dilemma have serious shortcomings. First, planners' attempts to
develop improved technical tools will always be limited by the complexity of
the problems with which they are dealing and the limits on human capabilities
to comprehend that complexity. While attempts to develop sophisticated,
computer-based technical analysis tools may improve the planner's understanding
of particular urban or metropolitan problems, this understanding will always
be limited by uncertainties about the future and by the need to consider a
great number of factors which shape the urban environment. Second, planners
are human beings, who have not been trained or specially selected for their
special ability to be totally objective in approaching issues, but rather
have been socialized and trained to believe in a particular set of values.
Often, these values (interest in promoting economic efficiency is probably
the prevalent type), are reflected in the particular technical tools and
evaluation criteria which planners apply to the analysis of problems. How-
ever, these values may not be shared by all those who make decisions. As a
result, planners' attempts to definitively analyze and resolve societal
problems will not reflect 'objectivity', but rather the personal value biases
of the planners themselves.
It is proposed here that planners must seek to identify a new role
for themselves which recognizes these limitations. In seeking to develop
this role, this research is based on two premises:
(1) That despite the seeming irrationality of political
decision-making which planners perceive, the processes of
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public policy development and implementation possess
elements of a political rationality; through these
processes, important conflicts between the diverse
values of different groups are resolved, and actions
are taken based on that conflict resolution; and
(2) That planners should seek to shape their activities
and the roles they play to complement the ongoing political
decision-making process, rather than replace it with their
technically 'rational' master planning process; thus
the planners can primarily play a role in helping the
political process consider issues which it otherwise
might overlook as it makes decisions which will shape
the future of a city or region.
This line of reasoning is not new to analyses of the planner's
dilemma. Meyerson and Banfield (1955), Altschuler (1965) and
Rabinovitz (1969) have all devoted major treatises to the topic. But this
research proposes to take a considerably more pragmatic approach to the issues.
While drawing on these existing analyses (which have been primarily based on
descriptive political science analysis), the focus here will be on the analysis
of a particular planning agency (the Metropolitan Transportation Commission
in the San Francisco Bay Area). The research will analyze this agency's
political context and its current organizational structure and planning
activities. Based on this analysis, suggestions will be made for changes in
the agency's organizational structure and set of planning activities to
provide improved technical guidance for the ongoing political decision
processes in the region.
12
Approach
In Chapter II, a review of the literature of existing models of
political decision-making and of political analysis of the planning process
is undertaken. A conceptual framework for the processes of public policy
development and implementation is developed, drawing common threads from
various portions of the political science literature. Current planning role
concepts are then critiqued through review of planning experience. Finally
this critique and the conceptual framework for public policy development
and implementation are linked in the development of a role concept for the
planner which would increase the effectiveness of the planner in providing
technical guidance to political decision-making processes. This concept
serves as the theoretical basis for the remainder of the analysis.
Chapter III then develops an understanding of the political
dynamics of the San Francisco Bay Area. Starting with a brief review of the
special nature of metropolitan (as opposed to urban) political processes, this
chapter attempts to build sequentially a firm, if limited, understanding of
the types of actors, the types of issues and the general political dynamics to
be found in the Bay Area. An attempt is made to simulate the limits of
information which the director of a metropolitan planning agency (and his or
her staff) would face in developing such an understanding. Thus a series of
regional and sub-regional policy issues and decisions which have occurred in
the region over the past 15 years will be reviewed in the order they occurred.
Information will be drawn from meetings with several of the political and
technical actors, transcripts of public hearings, recent agency documents
(both organizational and technical), newspaper coverage of major issues and a
number of other published political analyses of the Bay Area.
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Drawing upon the initial theoretical discussion of a role concept
for the planner, the analysis of the Bay Area political context and the
California legislative mandate for the Metropolitan Transportation Commission
(MTC), Chapter IV assesses the role which an agency like MTC can play and the
planning activities which MTC might carry out to support that role.
Chapter V then attempts to identify criteria by which the
effectiveness of MTC's current organizational structure and activities in
filling its role can be assessed. The chapter undertakes to analyze MTC's
current organizational strategy (i.e., its set of planning activities, the
relationship of those activities to political decision-making and its
priorities among those activities). Shortcomings in the effectiveness of this
strategy for fulfilling the roleof the agency of providing technical
guidance for governmental action are identified and an alternative
formulation is suggested and evaluated.
Finally, Chapter VI draws conclusions from this analysis on (a)
the value of political analysis of this sort in assessing organizational
strategies for MTC and (b) the potential applicability of this type of
analysis to other planning disciplines and in urban as well as metropolitan
planning.
14
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CHAPTER II
POLITICS AND THE ROLE OF PLANNING
A. Politics and Policy Development
Norton Long has described the local community as an "ecology of
games." He argues that individual actors, seeking to obtain their objectives
within their own 'games' (e.g., a house in a good neighborhood, political
power, increased profits), interact with other actors whose objectives are
in part or fully met by joint action. As a result, decisions are regularly
made and coordination regularly takes place in U.S. cities and metropolitan
areas; generally controlled by the market mechanisms of the regional economy
and the logic of personal and group interactions. Long notes, as an example,
that the massive task of feeding the New York Metropolitan Area is
accomplished with little, if any, overall planning. Through a series of acts
of small scale coordination, ends are achieved which are "collectively
functional, if unplanned."1
Graham Allison has theorized that this structure of games is
reflected in the competition within governmental politics. Governmental
action results, he argues, as "each player pulls and hauls with the power at
his discretion for outcomes that will advance his conception of national,
organizational, group, and personal interests." 2 Through political processes
of conflict resolution, actions are chosen which reflect, in some part, these
diverse interests.
Each city or metropolitan area has its own "ecology of games."
Different actors will take part in the games, and the distribution of power
16
will vary from place to place. While political and social scientists have
expended major efforts trying to identify one paradigm which describes the
political decision-making process in all urban and metropolitan areas, the
diversity of conclusions drawn from these efforts illustrates that there are
no hard and fast rules to be uniformly applied in the analysis of political
decision-making.
In place of such rules, this effort will identify a series of
common threads of these various political and social science viewpoints.
Similarities between different decision-making settings will be developed
into a conceptual framework for understanding the process of public policy
development and implementation. This framework is developed as a tool for
planners to apply in understanding the political context in which they are
operating. It is intended to aid the identification of the particular actors
and decision dynamics by which issues are resolved in a particular setting.
In addition, it will help the planner identify shortcomings in the way issues
are resolved, and particular activities which the planner could perform to
complement the political decision-making process.
Ultimately, this theoretical framework will be limited in its
usefulness. Building an understanding of a particular political context will
also require practical experience with decision-making in that context. The
framework is developed, therefore, as a starting point from which to build a
fuller understanding.
As public policy is developed and implemented, three distinct
elements of the policy development process can be identified. During
issue emergence, critical problems spur interest groups and actors to seek
public action to resolve particular issues (e.g., rapid growth, housing
17
shortages, traffic congestion). A second element is policy initiation,
where the actors interested in a particular issue undertake to develop a
governmental response within the rules and structure of the political system
in the city or region. Through processes of conflict resolution which
Meyerson and Banfield (among others3 ) have identified and categorized
(e.g., cooperation, bargaining, accomodation, dictation), a policy action is
decided upon and governmental resources are committed to that action
(e.g., a zoning plan, housing construction programs, establishment of a
transit agency). A third element is implementation, where policies are
carried out by designated governmental and private actors. During this
process, as Pressman and Wildavsky have suggested, the policy continues to be
shaped by the actors who must help implement it (e.g., employers who must
hire and train minority employees for government subsidized jobs).
Implementation is also shaped by the forces of delay and technical difficulty.4
As these three activities occur, policy issues will rarely be fully
resolved. Rather, new issues might emerge (e.g., the inadequacy of public
relocation compensation policy for urban renewal and highways or the lack of
coordination between two transportation agencies which have been established
to resolve different, but similar, issues) or the policy, as implemented,
might be inadequate to resolve the initial problems, thereby necessitating
reconsideration of governmental action.
Policy development, far from being a careful, sequential
consideration of issues as they arise, often proceeds simultaneously on many
different issues. This necessitates first, that individual actors choose
specific issues on which to concentrate their interest, time and resources
and second, that these actors, operating together within their particular
18
political systems, must select among the great number of issues which arise
at any one time.
Political and social scientists, in attempting to explain how this
process of issue selection and action occurs, have identified two major
factors: the systemic influences on the city or region and the distribution
of power among actors within that region. Systemic, or environmental,
influences, as generally described by Easton 5 and elaborated by Lineberry and
Sharkansky, 6 can include macro-economic trends, which give rise to particular
housing or land use issues, national and regional demographic trends, which
help shape the distribution of power and the nature of the political system
and national governmental policies, which affect the resources local
governments have to implement actions and may regulate how local governments
act. Systemic influences are the givens for local policy makers, as they
rarely are controllable at the local level. They may often be the key
determinants of the boundaries of public action.
Within the constraints laid down by the broader system, then, the
distribution of power (i.e., of resources useful in influencing public action7)
further shapes which issues are placed on the agenda for public action, what
types of dynamics rule the decision process (e.g., cooperation or contention
between equals, dictation where one actor holds significantly more resources) ,
which policies are selected and how those policies are implemented (i.e., by
whom and with what resources). Elitist8 and pluralist 9 paradigms have been
developed for power distributions and political dynamics in U.S. urban areas.
Rabinovitzl0 and Rossill have suggested that no one paradigm holds in all
political systems and that rather ,cities can be placed along a continuum with
different numbers of key actors, different political styles and different
19
diversities of interests. Given this conception, one can identify a typology
of decision-making processes similar to that developed by Rabinovitz,12 with
cities and regions ranging from cohesive political decision-making among a
homogeneous population, to competitive political decision-making among equal
but different major interest groups and to fragmented political decision-making
among numerous smaller interest groups.
While there are clear differences in the political dynamics which
occur in each of these systems, one factor would seem to remain constant.
In each case, whether there are a large or small number of actors involved in
decisions, each actor will have his or her own set of interests and the
political decision-making process will be asked to resolve conflicts between
these interests and choose publiactions. In a cohesive system, these
conflicts may be minor so that well-coordinated and consistent actions may be
possible. In more fragmented systems, conflicts may erupt into major contro-
versies resulting in actions which may be sporadic and inconsistent.
Nonetheless, in each case, actors must assess issues which have emerged,
identify their interests in those issues and choose strategies to have those
interests considered as public actions are decided upon.
It is proposed here that the decisions made and the strategies
followed by particular actors are based on a form of 'political rationality'.
'Rationality', in this context, is the careful consideration of one's
interests and of alternative means of serving those interests through public
action. The 'rational actor' has diverse goals and objectives (interests),
identifies alternative means of meeting those goals and objectives, evaluates
the ability of each alternative to meet each of these goals and objectives
and chooses one alternative according to how important each of these goals and
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objectives is to the actor.3 This, in essence, is a process very similar to
that which planners have attempted to apply to the technical analysis of
alternative master plans. 'Political rationality', however, will often
reflect personal considerations of increased power and status as well as
technical considerations of the broader social, environmental and economic
effects of different actions.
In actual decisions, an actor's behavior may not appear to be as
explicitly rational as this paradigm would suggest. As a result, actors, in
entering the political process and pursuing the satisfaction of their interests,
may often follow patterns of behavior which from a planner's perspective
seem irrational (e.g., support of a less stringent zoning plan than they
originally supported). However,' they actually may be seeking, in their
own rational way, to achieve certain interests tied to other particular
courses of action (e.g., future support on a transportation policy of greater
interest to an actor) or tied to personal goals of an actor (e.g., hopes of
achieving reelection endorsement from the chief opponent of the zoning plan).
This process of 'political rationality' will clearly be subject
to many of the same human limitations and biases which planners face in
attempting to rationally consider an issue. Nonetheless, insofar as such
behavior can be explicitly analyzed, a conceptual paradigm of this limited
form of 'political rationality' is described below:
(1) Goals and Objectives (interests) - Each actor is assumed to
have a set of implicit and/or explicit interests. 14 Implicit interests are
those which are rarely publicly stated, but which often guide an actor's
decisions. These may include interests in increasing one's personal
prestige (i.e., through achieving election to a higher office or by gaining
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increased personal power) or one's personal wealth (by accepting bribes or by
supporting an interest of another actor in return for a later reward of
appointment to a high paying job). Intimately tied to an actor's implicit
interests are his or her explicit interests. These are normally declared in
public statements and include support of programs to aid the poor, to provide
adequate health care or to preserve a neighborhood threatened by a highway.
In cases such as that of the official political actor, interests of
the actor in reelection may at first be implicit but may become more explicit
as elections come near. In addition, implicit interests such as increasing
one's own power and efficacy, may be critical to satisfying the explicit
interest of increasing the overall power and efficacy of one's constituency.
To begin to understand the key decision criteria by which actors
choose to support an action, one must discern both the implicit and explicit
interests of that actor. In practice, this may only be possible (a) after an
actor has had a period of time in which to match his or her interests to
particular actions and thereby identify key interests and (b) after many
years of observation of that actor's interests and behavior.
(2) A Range of Alternatives - Ideally, the individual actor moves
from his or her goals to the consideration of a full range of alternatives
which seek to attain those goals. As Lindblom has carefully argued, 15 there
are often constraints on the number and range of alternatives to be considered
at any one point, in part due to an actor's inability to treat any decision
point as an entirely new situation and in part due to human constraints on
time and knowledge.
Further, one might argue that the number of alternatives initially
considered is constrained by one or two of the actor's important goals at that
22
time. For example, groups interested in improving the mental health of the
poor and applying psychiatric care to the treatment of many different groups
may only consider means of providing psychiatric services to the poor. The
mental health of the poor, however, may depend much more heavily on improve-
ment of their economic and social living conditions than on individual
psychiatric care, thereby suggesting a much broader range of alternatives.
One last constraint on the range of alternatives considered is
"non-decision" (i.e., explicit 'decisions' by actors to not consider certain
alternatives in deference to the power of others who oppose those alternatives
as suggested by Bachrach and Baratzl6). However, as Wolfinger17 points out
it may often be difficult to distinguish conscious non-decisions from the
other limitations on alternatives, described above.
(3) Evaluation of Alternatives - Each actor, under this model, is
assumed to evaluate the alternatives under consideration based on three basic
types of criteria: the general viability of the proposal, its desirability
from the perspective of the actor's implicit goals and its desirability from
the point of view of explicit goals. Viability is a measure of the chances
of an alternatives' implementation. Criteria range from the technical
feasibility and resources available to the personal power resources available
and necessary for implementation. Implicit desirability builds on these
criteria to assess how following a particular alternative will affect the
balance of power and, in particular, the implicit personal interests of the
actor. Explicit desirability is concerned primarily with the substantive
changes achieved (e.g., implementation of a health insurance program) and
their positive and negative impacts. The degree to which any of these is
traded off against the others can only be assessed in the context of parti-
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cular actors and decisions (and may be impossible even then).
(4) Choice - The actor's choice of which alternatives to pursue and
finally agree upon can only be viewed in the context of the broader decision
arena. A particular actor's decision (to vote in a particular way, to lobby
for an action, to make a particular proposal) will to some extent be based on
the importance of his or her goals and the degree to which they are achieved
by the various alternatives. 18 But the choice of an alternative which does
not achieve some of the actor's implicit or explicit ends as effectively as
other possibilities may result from either deference to elite power which
opposes the more effective action (as Bachrach and Baratz suggestl 9 ) or
deference to the interests of the broader electorate (as Dahl suggests20 ).
The choice of an actor's behavior may be based as much on the
relative gains and losses of power for the various actors (i.e., implicit
goals) as on the substantive policy changes to be enacted. In one respect,
this process may be an effective means of reaching consensus on explicit
goals as well. Only when political actors are forced to decide between
actual proposals with different potential for achieving both implicit and
explicit goals can the real importance of either type of goal to the actor be
tested. Ultimately, the public action chosen will represent, to some extent,
consensus on the set of goals met by the action.
This framework for individual action within the governmental
decision process suggests several key aspects of the resolution of conflicts
between diverse interests and how this conflict resolution might shape public
policy actions. First, goal formulation and policy development take place in
many different areas (e.g., health, transportation, etc.) at the same time,
with different actors participating and differing sets of goals guiding public
24
actions. For example, Levin and Abend point out the considerable conflicts
between federal urban development goals suggested by urban renewal programs
to revitalize the central city and highway-oriented transportation programs
or federally insured home-ownership programs which encouraged suburbanization. 21
A second observation would suggest that the goals which emerge in
any one substantive area are likely to vary over time as a result of variations
in the number of other issues drawing the attention of political decision-
makers and temporal shifts in distributions of power. Thus groups interested
in transit service improvement rather than highway construction, when augmented
by environmentalists and the energy crisis, can gain at least temporary
advantage in developing public policy.
Third, the model would. uggest that development of goals is most
effectively accomplished when ends are tied to particular means. Thus the
individual actor is likely to adhere to many general goals until such time
that actual choices between satisfying explicit and/or implicit goals need
to be made. Only at that time is the actor asked to commit limited
resources of power and influence to achieve particular goals.
Fourth, actions resulting from this policy development process may
be considered in a less than comprehensive manner. One cannot deny that
self-serving (or implicit) goals may dominate the decision process and
exclude other factors. Where this takes the form of homeowners who do not
want to be relocated for a highway or immigrant groups seeking increased
political power, one can argue that a self serving perspective should be
considered in a decision process. Where, however, this involves potential
bribery of actors to influence their decisions, actions may benefit only a
few people at great cost to other groups. A second limitation on the
25
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comprehensiveness of public decisions may result from non-consideration of
particular aspects of an issue. This may occur when actors have limited time
or knowledge with which to consider decisions or when more powerful actors
choose to ignore the interests of less powerful groups. A final limitation
on comprehensiveness suggested by this model is that some actors would have
very short term interests (e.g., in reelection) which might result in long
term impacts of public actions going unnoticed in decisions. For example,
decisions in urban areas based on stabilizing the property tax rate in the
short run may not seriously consider the long run consequences of constrained
financing on the deterioration of public services.
One final observation on the goal formulation and policy develop-
ment process is that it might lead to relatively few major actions. At
times, actors will avoid making decisions where the feelings of their
constituents or the broader electorate about an issue are not well known.
More often, major actions may be hindered by powerful actors who consciously
(or passively 22) keep certain issues from being fully discussed and acted
upon.
This model of individual and group actors seeking to satisfy
interests within their own 'games' through participation in a broader public
policy development and implementation game has been briefly and generally
described. As such, it is difficult to subject the conceptual framework to a
rigorous empirical test. In place of such testing, several observations on
the nature of public goal development and the resultant public actions have
been drawn from the model. In the following section, planner's experience
with attempting to explicitly structure these goal selection and action
processes will be reviewed as a means of identifying (a) if in fact these
26
general observations on the political process appear to be valid and (b) the
extent to which planner's activities are well suited to public policy develop-
ment and implementation processes.
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B. Planning in its Political Context
Alan Altschuler has typified the comprehensive planner as having
three functions: "(1) to create a master plan to guide the deliberations of
specialist planners, (2) to evaluate the proposals of specialist planners in
the light of the master plan, and (3) to coordinate the planning of specialist
agencies so as to ensure that their proposals reinforce each other to further
the public interest." He further suggests that each of these functions re-
quires that the planners "(a) understand the overall public interest, at least
in connection with the subject matter of their plans, and (b) that they possess
causal knowledge which enables them to gauge the approximate net effect of
proposed actions on the public interest." 23 Altschuler might also have added,
as Francine Rabinovitz has done, that "the planner is traditionally envisioned
as an expert capable of discovering the answers to factual questions by
detailed analysis in a comprehensive framework. He is also expected to outline
a policy that has been rationally selected on the basis of his analysis . . .
The planner wishes his programs to be implemented, but he does not regard
himself as the promoter of selected paths of development."24  The planner,
in this light, is a technician, carrying out explicitly rational evaluations
of alternatives and presenting these alternatives to the decision-maker.
Most importantly, the planner's technical analysis is to be objective,
thereby raising it above everyday political considerations and providing an
unbiased basis for choosing governmental actions.
Although this traditional approach to planning has probably never
been fully implemented and alternatives to it have been proposed and tried in
recent years,25 much planning practice, education and research is still based
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on its inherent basic assumptions. Training for planners has sought to teach
planners to approach problems in a comprehensive manner. Planning education
includes smatterings of sociology, economics , architecture, engineering,
political science and many other disciplines. Research in the field has
sought to identify the causal links between public actions and the many
interrelated effects of these actions on ecological resources, the economy
and the social environment. Particular emphasis has been given to under-
standing the long term as well as the short term impacts of these actions.
Above all, this comprehensive approach has been technical in nature. Attempts
to develop mathematical models and quantifiable criteria for master planning
have been extensive. Most recently, computer technology has been applied in
an effort to expand the number and complexity of the issues with which
planners could deal.
However, as the introductory chapter suggested, planners, in
attempting to apply this knowledge, were faced with a dilemma. Political
decisions on public actions tended to neglect the analyses performed by
planners. As this dilemma has become all the more apparent, several major
studies of planning and the political decision process have been undertaken.
From these analyses, several key problems with the traditional planning
approach to providing technical information to guide the political process
have emerged.
First, it has become apparent that the planner is not always best
qualified to judge the public's interests and goals. The planner is trained
to view the 'public interest' as one set of unified goals which could be
grasped and applied to master planning. Altschuler points out, however,
that community consensus can often not be reached on abstract goals, hindering
29
efforts to develop overall master plans which could effectively be implemented.
As particular portions of a plan are tested (e.g., when a particular develop-
ment proposal is made) diverse community goals surface for the first time and
conflicts are resolved at that point by the political decision-making process.
As issues shift and community interests vary, different decisions reflect
different goal consensus, thereby rendering overall views of community goals
(i.e., the public interest) ineffectual in guiding community development. 26
Often decisions seem to be based on implicit rather than explicit goals
(e.g., the maintenance of the political machine). Such decisions, it appears
to planners, both hinder efforts to guide overall development of a city and,
from a reformist's perspective, benefit only a selected few at the sacrifice
of the great majority of citizens. Nonetheless, as Meyerson and Banfield
point out,27 the political machinations often reflect the statement of a
broader public interest (e.g., through providing jobs for many people) but in
a far less poetic and overall fashion than planners might adopt. Thus planners,
whose rational analysis depended in large part upon their ability to understand
a unified, well stated public interest, find actual expressions of the public's
interests to be numerous, inconsistent and often determined by a political
process which from their technical perspective is neither rational nor
objective.
A second problem emerges with numerous problems with the planner's
claim to bring technical expertise to the decision-making process. In most
cases, the planner's 'expertise' at considering the interrelationship of
urban development components is just not complete. Meyerson and Banfield
suggest that adequate planning information is both difficult and costly to
develop.28 Altschuler adds that in many cases the causal knowledge necessary
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to develop the information does not exist.29 Planning information is of
necessity based on very uncertain future conditions, often making the value
of the information questionable. Further, Meyerson and Banfield suggest
that the information which is most needed to guide decision-making, the
knowledge of the different political actors and their interests, is something
that planners hesitate to seek out and are often not privy to at all. 30
A third problem is that planners' objectivity and expertise often
either are used or challenged by the political process. Both Rabinovitz and
Altschuler cite the use of technical rationales to cover unpopular political
decisions (rather than technical influence upon the political decision).31
Further, as planners link themselves to particular actors (e.g., the Housing
Authority in Meyerson and Banfield, the business interests in Rabinovitz32)
in order to have their analyses considered, their analysis is challenged as
biased by other actors. In addition, the planners themselves often hold
certain biases which are not shared by the political decision-makers. Lastly,
planners are challenged by other technocrats (e.g., highway engineers) who use
simplified goals and planning techniques and thereby present an impression of
certainty to political actors which increases political confidence in the
proposals these technocrats present. Planners, by their nature, are interested
in comprehensive analysis, are often uncertain in conviction and therefore,
hesitate to make recommendations to the political actor.
These difficulties with traditional planning practice lead to the
'planner's dilemma': decisions being made with little or no reference to,
planning information. Levin and Abend cite the number of key regional
transportation decisions which were made during the course of major regional
transportation planning studies but with little reference to those studies. 33
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Studies of this type (i.e., to develop master plans) often take long periods
of time and the desire for 'rational objectivity' often leads them to be
separated from the day-to-day issues facing a region. As the previous dis-
cussion of politics and policy development suggests, however, issues and the
need for decisions emerge continuously as a result of systemic influences and
the distribution of power. Also, decisions have at times been made during
planning to avoid the need to have them considered as part of a master plan.
Thus in large-scale comprehensive planning one finds a perplexing paradox:
attempts to seek greater technical rationality and objectivity draw planning
activities further away from the continuing actions of government which shape
public policy and which the planner most directly seeks to influence.
As the particular capabilities which are claimed by the planner are
challenged, the planner's role in developing comprehensive master plans to
guide governmental action is muted. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the
political decision-making process can be limited in its comprehensiveness and
its ability to resolve complex issues which have technical aspects (e.g.,
developing a rail transit system or a housing construction program).
The planner, despite limitations on his or her capabilities, can
complement this limited political decision process in two ways. First, the
planner can provide some knowledge of the long term and comprehensive effects
of a proposed public action. Second, the planner can provide a 'way of
thinking' about public issues which recognizes the interrelationships between
different public actions and makes those relationships clear to those making
decisions. The question which remains is: how must the planner restructure
his or her role to provide this knowledge and way of thinking to political
decision makers in a form which will be used to guide public actions?
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C. Seeking a Role for the Planner
A political decision-making process has been described in which
governmental actions emanate from the interactions of various groups and
individuals, each seeking to satisfy their own set of interests. The process
is based on a form of 'political rationality', but that rationality is
limited. The planner, in seeking to guide this process, has attempted to
develop an alternative decision-making process, where goals are explicitly
structured and master plans are developed and technically evaluated to guide
the selection of the 'desired' future of a city or region. However, it has
become apparent that first the planner faces severe limitations in seeking to
guide this political process and that second, the political process actually
performs many of the functions which the planner sought to replicate in a
master planning process (e.g., goal selection, consideration of alternatives).
In this light, one can envision the role of the planner being to
complement the political decision process by performing the broad task which
John Friedman has posited of creating "the linkage between knowledge and
organized action." 34 Uinder this conception of the planner's role, the planner
would not seek to create one master plan to guide all action. Rather, the
planner attempts to link his or her knowledge to actions as they emerge from
the political processes of policy development and implementation. The planner
seeks to have each public decision made with an understanding of the full
range of effects of the decision and of the long term as well as the short
term implications of the decision.
Consideration of this type of role raises three major issues which
must be resolved before successful use of the role can be expected. First,
does this role make the planner into a political actor, thereby keeping the
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planner from holding any vestige of objectivity? Second, can this role, which
sacrifices efforts on long range, comprehensive plans to incremental decision
guidance, provide a long term framework for making decisions? Third, what
types and formats of information can the planner use to provide incremental
decision guidance effectively?
(1) The Planner as Political Actor - In the traditional planning
process, the planner is supposed to be objective and 'above' the quarrels and
in-fighting of politics. While clearly the planners have never been entirely
objective, one advantage they may have had in not taking sides on public
issues is that in some cases, they could play a 'neutral' role of bringing
together various actors to resolve important issues. The role for the planner
described briefly above raises two questions: (a) Do planners, by tying
their work more directly to the political decision process, lose any chance
for neutrality?, and (b) Perhaps even worse, are opportunities opened up by
this role for strongly biased planners to dominate the political decision
process? Answers to these questions require a more detailed description of
the proposed role of the planner.
Under this role concept, the planner would become a type of overseer
of the political decision process. As decision issues emerge, the planner's
efforts are directed at ensuring that a range of potential effects
and side effects of governmental action are considered in deliberations, that
long term consequences of actions are considered and that interest groups
which may have a stake in a particular decision but no organized voice to
express their interests would be mobilized or would have their interests
considered. The planner is interested in overcoming the tendencies of the
political process to limit the number of effects and interest groups it
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considers. This is accomplished by providing equitable access to that process
for all groups so that their interests may be considered. The planner does
not always speak for these groups, but rather helps them to speak for them-
selves.
This type of concept would actually involve different roles in
different political systems. 35 Within cohesive political systems where goals
are well-defined and homogeneous, the planner may best serve in the role of
technician, providing the expertise necessary to choose and implement actions.
Where cohesive systems have minority interest groups who are not represented
among the ruling elite, the planner may be required to play the role of
advocate. In less cohesive systems, the planner might play the role of broker,
by encouraging the coordination of diverse interests to achieve particular
courses of action (i.e., a 'neutral' role) or mobilizer, to make certain
groups aware of their interests in a particular action and then to encourage
their coordination with other groups who share their interests.
This type of varying role may be difficult to implement under current
institutional arrangements for planning (e.g., the city planner for the cohe-
sive city would have difficulty becoming an advocate for one group). There
are, however, possibilities for the planner to play this role even within
existing institutional constraints. First, the planner can develop information
which makes decision makers (even in cohesive systems) aware of all of the
effects of their actions (including effects on unrepresented minority
interest groups). Second, the planner can seek, through required citizen
participation and public hearing activities, to present this information to the
public, as well as decision makers.
In that planners would, under this role concept, be seeking to
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ensure consideration of all interest groups and would only in extreme cases
become advocates for particular interests (even then, planners would seek to
advocate for all unrepresented interests), the role concept does not necessar-
ily imply that it would be impossible for the planner to remain neutral.
There remains, however, the danger that as planners begin to fill this role,
strongly biased persons would use this cover of being 'an overseer for the
political process' to develop information which unduly influences the planning
process. For example, while a planner who has negative feelings toward
blacks may be a reasonable overseer on most issues, when a proposal is raised
to develop integrated housing, the planner might attempt to bias analysis of
this issue, to work only with a white group to help them express their
interests or to work with black'and white groups but deliberately mislead the
black groups. One would hope that such blatant bias, and even subtler versions
of it, would not be tolerated by other actors in the political process (much
as Altschuler 36 and Rabinovitz37 suggest). Nonetheless, the subtle biases
held by planners and the influence those biases have on what types of effects
and interest groups are considered will continue to limit the role which
planners can and should play.
(2) Planners and the Future - Many planners have argued that only
by stepping back from the day-to-day issues requiring governmental action is
it possible to assess the probable future trends, identify desirable changes
in those trends and suggest the actions necessary to achieve those changes.
They also argue that one cannot analyze day-to-day issues without basing that
analysis on an officially adopted master plan which illustrates the desired
patterns toward which the community is striving. Given these arguments, the
question is raised: how effective can the more incremental planning process
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suggested by the proposed role concept be without these long range master
planning activities to back it up?
In answering this question, it must first be remembered that while
planners have been taking this detached, long range view, major governmental
actions have often been chosen, in essence deciding what changes in the future
are desirable without benefit of the planner's expertise. For example, in
health planning, new regional agencies have been struggling to develop long
range planning efforts while hospitals expand facilities with little attention
to areawide planning efforts. 38 Clearly, decisions will continue to be made
by the political process. One route for the planner, it would seem, would be
to attempt explicitly to provide direct technical guidance for ongoing decisions
which would include long range considerations, rather than be poorly prepared
when the decisions inevitably arise during large scale planning efforts.
Nonetheless, without a framework for the future within which to
suggest alternatives and assess impacts, how well can the planner actually
provide guidance for these ongoing decisions? One simple and not wholly
satisfying response suggests that prediction of the future is so uncertain,
that the key factors are so difficult to identify, that any attempt (whether
large scale or incremental) at looking at future consequences is limited at
the start. A second response is to develop a methodology, within the
limitations on a planner's expertise, which can trace out the long term
implications of each decision by evaluating alternative streams of public
actions, rather than one fixed master plan. This methodology, which has
begun to be developed in transportation planning,39 would help political
decision makers recognize what future options for public action they are
leaving open or foreclosing by committing resources to specific public
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actions today.
A third response, and one perhaps, which should be the basis for all
planning, is that the continuing analysis of particular issues over time
(with conscious concern for the future) can build for the planner (and
potentially the political decision-maker) a better understanding of the total
set of issues, perhaps even a long range framework from which to view each
successive issue. One observer has described such an approach:
"Through the actions flowing from it, every choice results in
consequences only some of which can be foreseen. Because of
this we do not choose the future once and forever, but many times
over, as information about consequences becomes available, as we
adjust to other changes within the system, and as our attitudes
and values change. This choice of the future is, in reality,
a kind of exploration, or, better yet, an experiment that
involves a series of sequential steps and is corrected by a
continuous stream of information flowing back to us. Essen-
tially it involves a process of learning."40
(3) Planning Information and Political Decision-Making - Even when
planners have developed information concerning the effects of public actions
in the long and short run, there is the continuing possibility that the infor-
mation will not be absorbed or will be ignored by political actors. The
conceptual paradigm for 'political rationality' described previously suggests
that political actors consider both implicit and explicit criteria in making
decisions. Each actor's decision process of balancing implicit and explicit
interests is that process into which the planner must basically seek to
inject technical guidance. The planner, however, normally can provide only
information on the explicit aspects of public actions (e.g., environmental
impacts or the costs of developing an urban renewal project). As a result,
the planner's information may in some cases always be ignored, regardless
of what efforts the planner undertakes to improve his or her information.
Nonetheless, the proposed role concept for the planner offers several ideas
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for improving "the linkage" between planner's knowledge and public actions.
One idea has been suggested by John Friedmann. He argues that
various actors, with their day-to-day (personal) knowledge of a situation,
have important contributions to make to any planning process as do planners,
with their broader conceptual and factual (processed) knowledge of causal
relationships in the urban environment. He therefore sees planning going
beyond the preparation of graphic and written information to a transactive
style of planning where planners and the various interest groups mesh their
two special types of knowledge to guide decisions on courses of action.41
This perspective would argue that perceptions of and relationships with the
planner for different actors will shape the effectiveness of the planner in
linking knowledge to action. In- Francine Rabinovitz's less-than-cohesive
systems, the personal trust and prestige of the planner in the eyes of poli-
tical decision-makers clearly contributed to the planner's 'effectiveness'
in those situations.42 Both Altschuler43 and Levin and Abend44 also point out
that personal confidence in highway engineers rather than planners, in part
attributable to better knowledge of the people, resulted in relatively
greater adherence to the engineers' findings. If one envisions the political
process as a series of interactions between people, the planner's ability to
interact with people must be a key element of any attempt to provide better
technical guidance to the process.
A second idea suggests that by attempting to provide direct
guidance for ongoing political decisions, the subject matter of planners'
analyses should address more directly issues of immediate concern to the
political actors, increasing their interest in the results of planners'
analyses. Tied to this concept is a necessary emphasis on developing reports
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and presentations which are concise and clearly understandable to the various
political actors, rather than complex, overly long documents which hinder
attempts by these actors to assess the planners' analyses.
A third idea for improving "the linkage" between a planner's knowledge
and public action involves providing information in a manner which helps the
political process overcome its tendency to be less than comprehensive in
reaching decisions. In a more pluralistic political system, comprehensive
decisions may not be so difficult to achieve. While the existence of numerous
interest groups with equal power may increase the controversy and inconsistency
surrounding issue resolution in these systems, the existence of a number of
groups may also facilitate the planner's role of overseer to the political
process. The planner could develop information about the effects of a proposed
public action which illustrates how that action would affect the interests of
each interest group (e.g., the effects of a highway on an urban neighborhood,
some nearby marshland and the regional economy). With this information, each
interest group can press for its interests to be considered and the resultant
public action is likely to reflect these various interests as well as the
information which the planner originally developed.
Where more cohesive political decision-making occurs in elite
groups, this means of incorporating information may not be very effective.
While cohesive political systems may be capable of more consistent and less
controversial actions than pluralistic systems, the actions taken may often
ignore the interests of minority groups which are not part of the elite. In
these cases, the alternative roles for the planner (i.e., mobilizer or
advocate) may provide a better opportunity to press for consideration of
information on the effects of public actions and how those effects relate to
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interests of unrepresented interest groups.
The ideas proposed here are not new to planners. Robert Walker
(1950) and T.J. Kent (1964) both developed the planner's role as policy
advisor to major political actors (the chief executive and city council,
respectively).45  In recent years, trends toward increasing citizen partici-
pation in all phases of planning and towards focusing planning effects not on
long range goal formulation but on near term actions which shape the future
have moved planning in this direction. The Boston Transportation Planning
Review, in encouraging extensive citizen participation, in providing technical
assistance to community groups not capable of providing their own and in
focusing on particular facility development proposals with an aim to guide
particular governmental decisions, actively attempted to apply this broader
yet simpler role concept for planners of creating "the linkage between
knowledge and action."46 In another set of recent trends, efforts at develop-
ing improved program evaluation techniques to learn from the series of 1960's
'social experiments' and 'demonstration projects' have been accelerated. 47
One major topic to be addressed, it would seem, is how a city, or a
region, can go about creating a continuing planning capability of this type.
What sort of planning activities should be carried out? What types of insti-
tutional and personal relationships should planners maintain with political
decision makers? These questions are those which must be faced by the
directors of planning agencies as they decide upon the tasks which their
agency will perform and on the role that agency will play. The directors
must assess the particular political context in which they operate and
devise organizational strategies to provide decision oriented information to
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the policy development and implementation process while helping that process
build on understanding of the future implications of their actions. The case
study which follows of transportation politics and planning in the San
Francisco Bay Area addresses these questions.
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CHAPTER III
UNDERSTANDING METROPOLITAN POLITICS:
THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA
A. Introduction: The Metropolitan Political Culture
Metropolitan areas in the United States have experienced rapid
growth throughout much of the twentieth century. As a result of foreign and
rural migration into Urban areas and the spreading of urbanized areas
commonly characterized as 'suburban sprawl', the great majority of United
States residents now live in metropolitan areas. As suburbanization proceeded,
spurred by population growth, improving economic conditions and increased
mobility offered by the train and then the car, the covernmental structure of
urban areas could not keep pace with the new sets of problems which were
arising. Many central cities attempted to annex suburban areas as they grew,
but these attempts were foreshortened by inflexibility in the process of
changing governmental structures and defensiveness on the part of newly
forming suburban areas which did not wish to have their political futures
tied to those of the much larger central city. As a result, metropolitan
areas were left with fragmented governmental structures but with common
economic and social interests (i.e., the central city as the center of employ-
ment, retail business and entertainment in the metropolitan area).
As the dependence on the central city has been reduced over the
years, this fragmentation of institutions has helped to create several major
problems in the ongoing maintenance of the metropolitan areas. One group of
observers1 has pointed to two major issues which have arisen: (1) maintenance
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of key elements of the areas' economic and social systems and (2) unequal
distribution of resources and services in the metropolitan areas.
(1) Maintenance of the system: A number of key elements serve as
"the lifeblood" of metropolitan areas. Some, such as communications,
are largely in the private sector. But many, most notably, transpor-
tation, sewer, and water and power facilities, are critical to the
continuing economic and social well being of the regions but cannot
be fully developed by the private sector. Continuing trends of
population growth and spread create demands for increased levels of
service from each of these elements. But the facilities necessary
to provide these services must cross boundaries of the many
political jurisdictions, and must, as a result, be dealt with from
the perspective of all of the jurisdictions rather than the
individual perspective of each government.
(2) Unequal distributions of resources and services: As metropolitan
areas grew and suburban areas established political autonomy, distinct
socioeconomic patterns emerged. Central cities most often held the
majority of the region's businesses and a fairly healthy tax base
but their resident population consisted largely of the poor.
Suburban areas, on the other hand, became the residential domain of
the middle and upper middle classes. However, as trends in the
suburbanization of industry and commerce have continued, central
cities and nearby working class suburbs have had to provide
extensive services for their large poor populations (e.g., health,
education) with resources drawn from an ever-decreasing tax base.
The suburbs, on the other hand, with rising property values and
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industrial investments, could provide services to their generally
wealthier population by levying relatively low levels of taxes.
Emerging from this unbalance were three clear interest groups in
the metropolitan area: the downtown businessmen, interested in
reviving central city commerce in which they had substantial
investments, the poor and working class, suffering from very high
tax rates and an inadequate delivery of services and the suburban
interests interested in improving access to the central city but
also in maintaining autonomy from the fiscal burdens of the
central city.2
As these two issues emerged, it became apparent that no institutional
mechanism existed at the regional level to resolve them. Attempts to fill
this void in the metropolitan governmental structure have taken several forms.
Where particular issues have become large enough to merit attention, state
governments have often stepped in (most notably in the case of highways) or
local governments have joined together (with state approval) to form special
regional and subregional authorities (e.g., transit and port authorities,
sewer and water districts, etc.). In almost all cases, special authorities
and state agencies have had responsibility for one or two facets of the
metropolitan problems described above and often, only incomplete authority in
those areas (e.g., only transit or only one portion of the sewer system). As
political scientists have noted 3, these responses to metropolitan problems
have actually amplified some of the problems. While some regional purposes
have been accomplished (e.g., development of a basic regional water system)
these new agencies have in many cases only increased the existing governmental
fragmentation in urban areas, further complicating attempts to coordinate the
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different key elements of regional development and resolve conflicts between
different interest groups.
To remedy this problem, political and social scientists have often
suggested that metropolitan governments be created 4, to either take over the
key responsibilities from the various existing institutions or in some cases
to take over all the functions of the local government. However, attempts to
implement such governments in U.S. metropolitan areas have generally not
succeeded. As Scott Greer has pointed out, while a diversity of interest
groups have supported such a scheme (e.g., business, good government groups,
civic elites), the most notable opposition has come from local governments. 5
These governments, and those who head them, are in a difficult position.
They oppose increasing state control over decisions which affect their
communities (e.g., state highway programs) and therefore support some form
of regional decision-making forum. However, at the same time, they fear the
loss of all of their local decision and implementation prerogatives to a
formal metropolitan government.
Most often, the reluctance of local governments to support formal
metropolitan government has resulted in the development of voluntary
associations or councils of governments (COG's). With encouragement from the
federal government, these agencies have flourished in metropolitan areas.6
These agencies have sought to coordinate activities of the various institu-
tions and to develop comprehensive capabilities to help guide the development
of the region. However, the structure of the agencies, the limitations on
their resources and the diversity of the metropolitan areas they seek to
coordinate and plan have hindered their effectiveness in dealing with major
regional issues. 7 Several key weaknesses of the agencies can be cited:
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(1) Limited Powers - Not surprisingly, the preferences of COG mem-
bers for local autonomy has in most cases left the COG's with few real powers.
Generally, their only "powers" are extended by higher levels of government
(federal and state). The federal government's A-95 review process 8, setting
up the COG as the regional clearinghouse for all federally funded proposals
in a region, provides the COG's with "powers" of review and comment on most
major public development proposals. Such comments, however, are only advisory
and rarely carry much weight. Further, the review normally comes at the end
of the proposal development process, making the proposing agency unwilling to
make major changes at a COG's request. As a result, A-95 review can take up
a significant portion of the COG staff's time and resources with few major
tangible results. More recently,, in part due to the ineffectiveness of the
A-95 type process, some COG's have been given increased powers. For example,
the Federal Urban Mass Transportation Administration has stated that it will
not allow the Los Angeles transit agency to begin preliminary engineering
on its proposed transit system until the Southern California Association of
Governments has approved that system as a portion of its regional transporta-
tion plan. However, even where greater powers have been authorized, one finds
a reluctance to use them. Most often, this reluctance can be directly tied to
a second problem, the political instability of the COG's.
(2) Political Instability - The vast majority of COG's are volun-
tary agencies, i.e., any or all of the members can withdraw at their own
pleasure, effectively damaging the legitimacy of the COG. As a device to
ensure equitable treatment of all regional constituents, this element of
member freedom can be valuable. At the same time, unless almost all of the
members of a COG have unified criticisms of a proposal, it is unlikely that
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even the most cogent technical analysis will bring a COG to strongly criticize
or reject a proposal. Further, the annual round of city council and board of
supervisors' meetings at which COG membership is decided upon takes up enor-
mous quantities of staff time and resources and creates annual cycles of
uncertainty in the development of planning efforts. Although pressures for
planning which is sensitive to the political process may be a desirable outcome
of such instability, the need for near unanimity on an issue before a COG will
act (rather than the majority necessary in most democratic actions) hinders
any strong action to coordinate or shape regional development.
(3) Issues of Political Responsiveness - Voting membership in COG's
is almost always held by officials of local government or their appointees.
Major local controversies over highway development and zoning have often
indicated that local elected officials (particularly those from areas with city
or county wide elections) respond, in their actions, to the interests of
some groups (e.g., businessmen as campaign contributors and the backbone of the
local tax base) but not to the interests of others (e.g., residents of poor
neighborhoods). Only if the decision structure of a COG is capable of
responding to all common interests across political jurisdications (i.e., the
poor as well as businessmen) can development decisions of a COG be considered
comprehensive and reflective of the full set of regional interests. The
preponderence of local government officials on COG policy boards, therefore,
raises major issues about the effectiveness of the COG's in being responsive
to all regional interest groups.
(4) Limited planning capabilities - In addition to the lack of
powers which COG's face and their difficulty in using what power they have,
COG's also face limitations on the planning capabilities which they can bring
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to the analysis of regional issues. First, COG's have generally been funded
by apportioned contributions from the constituent governments and limited
federal funds. As a result, they rarely have large staffs and comprehensive
planning expertise. One result of this shortage is that staff, particularly
in large metropolitan areas, spend so much time on going to meetings with other
agencies, precessing the numerous A-95 reviews and "fighting fires" that
they don't have time to do planning. Second, as Levin and Abend and others9
strongly point out, comprehensive planners lack any very well defined
methodology for analyzing regional issues. Attempts at complicated land use
and transportation models met with considerable theoretical and operational
difficulty in the 50's and 60's and often were too cumbersome and expensive
to provide timely information for political decision-making. Finally, and
perhaps most important, these limitations forced COG's to rely on the
technical expertise of other regional agenices. Special regional agencies
(e.g., transit, ports, sewers) often had relatively sophisticated staffs and
well developed plans for implementation. In most cases, these were the
only source of information sought out and presented to COG decision-makers.
Clearly this information reflects the objectives and assumptions of the
agency preparing it (e.g., build the transit system, expand the airport) and
this can effectively undermine attempts by COG's and their staffs to establish
balanced perspectives on major issues.
This review of COG problems presents, in brief, 4 key elements in
the general ineffectiveness of COG's as regional policy development bodies.
The San Francisco Bay Area, in its efforts to develop a regional policy body,
has almost been a textbook case of the difficulties of dealing with regional
issues. The Association of Bay Area Governments was one of the first of its
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kind in the country. Throughout its history, it has been hindered by most of
the problems cited above which plague COG's in general.
In recent years, however, the Bay Area, with help from the
California State legislature, has taken two major steps toward a more formal
regional government. First, in 1965, the Bay Conservation and Development
Commission (BCDC) was established to plan for and regulate development around
the Bay. Then, in 1970, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) was
established to plan for and decide on future highway priorities and future
transit development in the region. In both of these cases, local membership
was mandatory and increased funds were made available for staffing the agencies.
The policy boards of these agencies continued as official representatives from
local governments (although this 'wasn't totally the case for the BCDC).
Thus, in conservation and transportation, the Bay Area has sought
to solve the problems of the COG and establish real regional planning and
decision-making authority. In the remainder of this chapter, an attempt will
be made to understand the particular metropolitan political context of the
Bay Area which developed these agencies with particular emphasis on transpor-
tation issues.
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B. The Approach
Understanding the entire political system of a metropolitan area is
a very difficult task. Nonetheless, it is crucial that the director of a
metropolitan planning agency understand at least the basic political context
in which decisions are made in the metropolitan area. Otherwise, his or her
efforts to direct a planning staff and to guide the development of technical
information to serve as a basis for political decisions will very likely not
provide information which is suitable to the decision process. The director
must be able to identify what types of issues are likely to emerge and what
interest groups will have a stake in decisions on those issues. Only with
this type of information can the director decide what types of analysis should
be done and when they should be done to provide timely information to guide
decisions.
In attempting to develop this understanding, the director is faced
with several opportunities but must overcome several disadvantages. The
director is likely to be intimately involved in the analysis and resolution of
many regional issues, providing opportunities to observe the types of issues
being discussed and the interests and personalities of key political actors
in the region. At the same time, however, the pull of day-to-day responsibi-
lities for running an agency and for "fighting fires" which arise from those
responsibilities can hinder the director's ability to take advantage of these
opportunities. The-director may be left with little free time to reflect on
the decisions being made, making it difficult to draw in-depth inferences
from his or her rich experiences to guide the ongoing planning activities of
the agency.
In place of a time consuming, in-depth analysis of the political
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context in which he or she is working, the most viable means for the planning
director to develop an understanding of that context may be by building that
understanding over time, through observation of and participation in the
resolution of various regional and sub-regional issues. If the director steps
back briefly from each decision and takes stock of the political implications
of the particular events, he or she can piece together the basic issues,
actors and political dynamics which shape regional and sub-regional decisions
on development and the future of the region. From that base, the director can
then begin to structure the planning activities of the agency to provide
information which can most usefully guide future regional decisions.
In the following section, an analysis of the political context of
transportation decision-making in the San Francisco Bay Area, using this
approach, is performed. First, a broad overview of the Bay Area and its
governmental structure is given. Then a series of nine issues, starting
with the development of the Bay Area Rapid Transit system and ending with
recent issues in highway and transit development, is reviewed. Wherever
possible, primary source material (i.e., documents, hearing transcripts,
interviews and newspaper coverage) have been used to piece together how
the issues were resolved. In certain instances, existing analyses of the
issues by other authors have also been used. The review of each issue will
not be done in depth, but rather will seek to identify key actors, key
issues and the nature of the decision process in each case. At each step,
an attempt will be made to identify common threads among issues and begin
to structure an understanding of the overall political context. In the
concluding section of this chapter, generalizations about the Bay Area's
political context will be drawn from this learning process. These are
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intended as a basis for the later discussions of the role of the Metropolitan
Transportation Commission and the kind of planning activities it can best
carry out to fill that role.
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C. Transportation Politics in the San Francisco Bay Area
The San Francisco Bay Area, ccnsisting of the nine counties touching
the Bay, has experienced rapid growth since the end of World War II. Spurred
by wartime production activities, an excellent natural harbor and the moderate
climate, the population, by 1970, had climbed to 4.6 million people. Despite
its large size (its area is 7,000 square miles, nearly that of Massachusetts
and New Jersey combined), over 70 percent of the region's population and
80 percent of its eco-nomic activity is concentrated in 10% of the region's
land area, on the land adjacent to the Bay. This pattern owes much to the
presence of the Bay and the mountains surroundinq it which constrain a narrow
Bay Plain. For approximately one hundred miles from San Francisco south to
San Jose and then north to Richmond, this Bay Plain contains virtually
uninterrupted urban development.
Although San Francisco is the region's largest city (with roughly
700,000 population) the area has three urban centers; San Francisco, Oakland
and rapidly growing San Jose. The existence of three centers and economic
ties built from the region's earliest days by boat commerce between these
centers, have resulted in a balance of social and economic interests throughout
the region which is generally not found in traditional metropolitan areas with
one major center. The region's fast growth and its physical constraints
on that growth have spurred the development of a regional highway (and now
rail transit) system in the densely developed urbanized corridors near the
Bay. In recent years the existence of the Bay as a natural as well as
commercial resource and efforts to expand the region's limited land area by
filling that Bay have spurred considerable concern for the environment. At
the same time, the large black and Mexican populations in San Francisco,
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Oakland, and San Jose have, as in the rest of the country, sought more
opportunities to better their social and economic life. As we shall see,
the development of transportation facilities and programs has become
intimately intertwined in these issues.
Institutionally, the local governments of the San Francisco Bay
Area are predominantly of the council-manager or council-administrator
form. In county governments, which serve as overseers for city governments
and the only government for non-incorporated areas, a similar arrangement
exists with boards of county supervisors and a professional county adminis-
trator appointed by the supervisors. All local officials in California are
elected under a non-partisan system. With a few exceptions, they are elected
at large and against the entire field of candidates. 10 Bay Area governments
strongly reflect the outward trappings of reformist government structure,
spurred by the good government movement in the country as a whole and in
part due to the early, corrupt control of California politics by the wealthy
owners of the railroads.11
As in many other metropolitan areas, actors in the Bay Area have
identified over the years a number of major issues concerning parks, sewers,
water, air quality and transportation which could not be resolved by local
governments acting alone. To resolve these issues, the Bay Area, taking
advantage of state laws which encourage the development of special districts,
set about developing a series of special districts to deal with each particular
problem. Each district is made up of various cities and counties, is governed
by an elected or appointed board of directors and can levy property taxes to
fulfill its particular function. Stanley Scott and John Corzine have noted
that "there are nearly five hundred special districts in the nine-county Bay
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Area, excluding school districts, multi-county districts, irrigation districts
and a number of others whose functions are not urban in character. (emphasis
added)." 12 When one adds to this number the major multi-county districts
such as the Bay Area Rapid Transit District and the Bay Area Air Quality
Control District, as well as the state agencies such as the local district of
the State Department of Transportation and the Toll Bridge Administration
(for bridges across the bay), a brief picture of the labyrinthine governmental
structure in the Bay Area emerges. The series of issues reviewed in the
following brief sections will further illustrate how this cumbersome structure,
and particularly the major transportation actors in this structure, interact
to resolve regional issues.
* * * * *
Regional Rapid Transit for the Bay Areal3
Rapid population growth in the Bay Area after World War II and
highway travel corridors constrained by the area's geography brought traffic
congestion to crisis proportions during the 1950's (from 1954 to 1959,
vehicles travelling across the two major Bay bridges rose by 44%). In
recognition of the increasing problems that this congestion was causing
and the importance of the San Francisco and Oakland central business districts
as employment centers for the region, a nine county Bay Area Rapid Transit
Commission was formed by the State Legislature in 1954 to study the feasibility
of implementing transit. As a result of the Commission's work, five counties
(San Francisco, Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin and San Mateo) joined together
in 1957 to form the Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART). This agency,
funded through property taxes levied in each county, was charged with
developing a five county rail rapid transit system for the Bay Area. Thus, as
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had been done many times in the past for parks, water and sewer problems, an
issue emerged in the Bay Area (traffic congestion) and an attempt was made to
resolve the issue by establishing a special district to implement solutions.
With the mandate to develop plans for a rapid transit system,
BART proceeded to hire consultants and prepare a master plan for the system.
In June 1961, final plans were submitted for a 120 mile system with 52
stations throught the five counties. From its inception, the plan clearly
represented the development of a commuter rail system in the Bay Area
(rather than a local tiransit service system) to speed workers and shoppers to
the central cities. As BART proceeded to seek regional approval of the system
and funding for it, this characteristic played a major part.
Final approval to implement the system ultimately rested with the
voters, as they had to approve the $792 million bond issue necessary for
implementation. From its start, the system had been promoted most strongly by
the well organized business organizations of San Francisco and Oakland and
by labor (particularly the construction unions). However, approval of the bond
issue required approval by 2/3 of the voters throughout the district and the
degree to which the costs of the system would raise property taxes became a
major issue before the vote ever took place. San Mateo County, fearing
much higher taxes, and already having the services of the Southern Pacific
Railroad, withdrew from BART. Marin County also withdrew, citing technical
difficulties of building transit across the Golden Gate Bridge, higher taxes
and fears of rapid development in the largely undeveloped county. The
issue of the tax burden imposed by building the system so threatened approval
of the bond that BART in early 1962 persuaded the California Legislature
to lower the required majority from 2/3 to 60%. When the vote came through,
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approval was given, but just barely (61.2% approved overall; 68% in San
Francisco, 60% in Alameda and only 54% in Contra Costa County). Contra Costa
County initiated a tax payers suit against the reduction of the required
majority and generally protesting the high-priced selling campaign which BART
and the businessmen put into obtaining approval. The suit failed, and BART
was given approval to develop its system.
However, as that occurred, two major problems arose. First, the
initial funding estimates were woefully inadequate (even including funds
delegated from Bay bridge tolls to finance construction of the underwater
tube across the Bay). Thus BART was engaged (and continues to be today) in
repeated clashes with the state legislature over approval of alternate means
of funding (e.g., the sales tax).., As long as this has not involved any new
commitments of statewide funds, the legislature has served as a de facto
regional government with key actors in the debates being the representatives
from the Bay Area. But the continuing financial troubles of BART have
affected the quality of the system implemented and soured the public
image of the agency.
The second major problem involved design and construction of the
system. The BART masterplan (of 75 miles after the two counties withdrew) was
prepared with little local participation. Design of the stations, although
originally delegated to noted architect Lawrence Halprin, soon reverted to
the engineers when financial troubles hit and Halprin's ideas proved too
costly. In many areas,proposed designs were presented, but strong community
reaction forced additional delay as stations were redesigned. Perhaps the
largest of these controversies occurred in Berkeley where the proposed elevated
structures through the middle of the city would have created a barrier between
62
the poor black and affluent white sections of the city. Strong protests
and offers from the city of Berkeley to pay for underground construction
persuaded the BART engineers to redesign the portion of the system through
the city.
As has become apparent in the past four years as the system has
begun to operate, another major implementation problem involves the sophisti-
cated electronic technology which was supposed to result in major labor cost
savings for the system. As this is being written, the system, originally
scheduled for total operation in 1971, has only recently opened its operations
on both sides of the Bay. The trans-bay tube, the key link in the system, has
not yet opened due to the system's technical difficulties (the current
projected date is sometime in 1975). As one result of these technical delays,
the current labor costs of operating the system (even without the entire
system in operation), are higher than those originally predicted.
The development of the BART system represents almost a classic
example of the three elements of the policy development and implementation
process outlined in Chapter II. Taken as a whole, the decisions made as issues
emerged and as policies were initiated and implemented reflect three important
points about the political dynamics of the Bay Area. First, the system,
oriented to providing commuter rather than intra-city rail transit, was
influenced in its conception and design by the powerful business interests in
downtown Oakland and San Francisco. In their eyes the chief benefits of the
system were to reduce traffic congestion to the central cities and to raise
property values in the CBD's. In the early stages of design and bond
approval, their influence in the legislature (in getting the required majority
reduced and getting Bay Bridge Tolls for BART construction) appears to have
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been great.
A second point illuminated by the BART experience is that these
central city interests in BART construction were opposed by strong suburban
sentiments which supported the concept of the system but not its high cost.
San Mateo and Marin counties both saw the costs of the system as too high for
the benefits they would reap. Marin County also feared that some of the
benefits (i.e., increased property values and development near BART stations)
would damage it' undeveloped areas. Even part urban, part suburban Contra
Costa County showed ambivalence towards the system despite the considerable
support for the system in the county (54%). While these suburban fears of
tax increases clearly affected the ultimate size of the system, the suburban
influence in the early years of planning and approval seems to have been less
than that of the central city business interests.
The third point which the BART experience hrings out involves the
nature of regional decision-making in the Bay Area. Many key decisions
(e.g., establishment of BART transfer of toll monies to fund construction,
lowering the required bond approval minimum) could not be made by any regional
group and thus became the province of the state legislature. But within the
state legislature, a form of de facto regional government emerged. Purely
regional issues (i.e., those involving not taking funds from other parts of
the state) were generally resolved by the legislators from the Bay Area and
ratified by the rest of the legislature. Thus, in BART's early stages, the
influence of the pro-BART forces and the traffic crisis in the Bay Area
brought the Bay Area delegation to strongly support BART. As BART's problems
have grown, as disfavor with BART's management has increased and as some of
the suburban areas have growi in population and political strength, this
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regional forum has not been unified on BART actions.
* * * * *
Fighting the Freeways 14
In California, the major impetus for development of a comprehensive
freeway system has come from the federal and state levels. The federal
highway trust fund, established in 1956 with gasoline tax revenues, provided
90% of the funds for construction of the extensive Interstate Freeway System
in California and other states. The state's interest in establishing a free-
way system was strongly expressed in 1959. Senator Rand-olph Collier, then
chairman of the Senate Transportation Committee, directed a study by the
state Department of Public Works which recommended implementation of a
12,000 mile system funded by state and federal highway funds. The State
Highway Commission, a board appointed by the governor, was charged with
overseeing the expenditure of state highway funds and the implementation of
the freeway system. To implement the system, the State Division of Highways,
(formerly a portion of the State Department of Public Works and now part of
the new Department of Transportation) today maintains 11 semi-autonomous
district headquarters, each charged with planning and designing the freeways
and overseeing their construction in their particular geographic areas.
Despite the general dominance of the state in deciding highway
matters, one key California legal provision ensures that the local
community plays a role. Essentially, any local community holds a veto power
over road construction by refusing to sign the required "route adoption" and
"freeway agreement" for the closing of streets during construction of the
project. In the Bay Area, this provision provided the key leverage in a major
turnabout in local views cf highways in the late 1950's and early 1960's.
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During the early stages of freeway development in the Bay Area, the
Area's political actors were generally in favor of freeway construction, even
in the crowded urban core areas. A 1948 master plan for the freeway system in
San Francisco, which was approved by the Board of Supervisors in 1951,
included major freeways through the city including one (the Western freeway)
through Golden Gate park and another (the Embarcadero-Panhandle freeway) along
the harbor front connecting the Golden Gate and Oakland bridges. The latter
was seen as a critical link in the San Francisco and state highway systems.
Until the middle and late 1950's, freeway construction proceeded smoothly
with strong support from local political actors, the San Francisco Chamber of
Commerce and the local press.
However, proposals to build through Golden Gate Park and the initial
construction of the Embarcadero freeway as an unsightly two-tiered structure
in the late 1950's brought about strong protests of the aesthetic and environ-
mental impacts of such construction. Active lobbying with the city-county
supervisors was engaged in by neighborhood groups (largely from affluent
neighborhoods) and conservation groups. The California Division of Highways
and the San Francisco Department of Public Works were at the time advancing
predicted traffic figures which they felt justified building the freeways.
But the opposition aroups countered that new roads would only encourage more
traffic, that any design severely damaged their neighborhoods and that transit,
rather than highways should be developed to provide transportation service.
This effective opposition combined with the fact that the chief private
proponents (the S.F. Chamber of Commerce) were preoccupied at the time with
developing and selling a regional rail transit system (and thus could not
effectively lobby for the freeways), brought about the adoption on
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January 29, 1959, of the "Freeway Revolt Resolution," which stated that no
freeway agreement would be signed for the critical central portions of the
San Francisco freeway system.
Although this "revolt" was the first such drastic action in the Bay
Area (and in the nation as well), similar issues also emerged in Berkeley (the
Ashby Freeway) and in Oakland (the Mac Arthur and Grove-Shafter Freeways).
While these controversies did not always result in a total halt of freeway
constuction as occurred in San Francisco, the events clearly played a role in
creating two characteristics of the Bay Area's reactions towards highway
construction. First, a general feeling emerged that highways could not serve
the transportation needs of the core areas fully, that they severely damaged
the urban environment and that considerable improvement in transit service was
needed as well. The mayors of San Francisco were the leading promoters of
this attitude. The core area business community continued to supbort further
freeway construction, but in a passive manner, as did the suburban and more
rural sections of the Bay Area. As a result, with the exception of a few links
in Oakland, San Francisco and Berkeley, the California Freeway and Expressway
system in the Bay Area has largely been constructed.
A second major characteristic has involved the bitterness of
personal and institutional relations between major political actors in the
Bay Area and the state structure of highway decision-making. San Francisco's
Mayor Shelley and his successor Joseph Alioto have taken strong personal
stands against highway development and the people who perform it. Despite
the loss of money intended for San Francisco freeway construction (the
Embarcadero freeway) to a project in Los Angeles (or perhaps as a result of
that loss), Alioto, in 1967, attacked the California Highway Commission and
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the engineers of the Division of Highways as "arrogant and power drunk." His
dislike for the state role in highways development (and the similar feelings
among San Francisco Supervisors) has greatly influenced other controversies
in the Bay Area. In one, the Junipera Serra freeway dispute (1967-68) the
city protested the impacts of the freeway on city owned reservoir properties,
but the discussion of the alternatives to that location sounded more like a
name-calling contest than a substantive discussion of the issues. While the
entire Bay Area does not share the extreme views of San Francisco (in fact San
Mateo and Santa Clara counties were angered by San Francisco's blocking of the
Junipera Serra freeway) the feelings being expressed are felt in other portions
of the region as well. Most importantly, the fact that regional decisions
about highways were made by the remote California Highway Commission (a group
strongly influenced by the gas, trucking and automobile highway lobbies) has
angered Bay Area groups.
Maintaining the Existinq Transit Service 15
Transit service in the Bay Area (other than BART) is administered
by three very different agencies. In the East Bay, transit is provided by the
Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District (AC) established in 1956 to take over
the about-to-be-defunct Key system. AC's progressive management has developed
good quality bus service to the different urbanized parts of the East Bay and
has maintained a sound financial picture through good management of its
profitable trans-bay service.
In San Francisco, a city department, the Municipal Railway (MUNI),
is responsible for extensive bus and trolley service. MUNI is in a very
different position from AC, facing a shortage of capable management expertise
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and very costly labor agreements with MUNI employees. The rapidly increasing
deficits of the system (encouraged by fares kept very low by political pres-
sure) have been an annual source of city controversy. The image they have
created of MU1I as a burden on the tax base makes it very difficult to obtain
public approval of bond issues for needed capital and equipment improvements.
The third major operator in the area, the Golden Gate Bridge,
Highway and Transportation District has only recently entered the transit
field. The district, consisting primarily of San Francisco and Marin
counties, was initially established in 1928 to construct and administer the
Golden Gate bridge. In the late 1960's, when the bridge's bonds were about
to be paid off by the continued toll collections, the District considered
several courses of action: (1) dissolving the district and giving the
California Division of Highways responsibility for maintaining the bridge,
(2) adding more car lanes to the bridge and (3) expanding the responsibilities
of the district to include development and operation of 1larin county transit
service and development of Marin-San Francisco ferry service. The district,
with the blessing of the state legislature, chose the latter course in 1968.
The district's move toward this broader perspective was particularly
spurred by Marin county's interest in developing transit service and not
encouraging more automobile oriented growth in the area and San Francisco's
interest in not encouraging more automobile travel into the already congested
city. Since the time of the change, the district has used bridge toll
surpluses to finance the purchase of equipment for and the operation of bus
and ferry service for commuting and other trips between Marin County and
San Francisco.
The developmcnt of the Golden Gate and AC transit districts clearly
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reflects conscious attempts by portions of the Bay Area to resolve transporta-
tion issues as they have emerged. The three agencies together play important
roles in providing intra- and inter-city transit service. However, as the
region has developed each agency to respond to a particular issues, these
agencies were not formed with a comprehensive view of providing coordinated
intra- and inter-city transit for the entire region. When BART is also added
to this group, conflicts between the agencies' objectives which hinder careful
coordination become complex. Thus, transit in the Bay Area has developed under
four different agencies, all competing for the limited resources available from
the property taxes in each of their constituent counties. As of the late
1960's, these agencies had neither the centralized planning and coordination
of the California Division of Highways nor the abundant funding of state and
federal highway trust funds with which to provide transit service to the Bay
Area.
* * * * *
Strides and Little Stens toward Regional Government16
The tendency of the Bay Area to resolve different issues which
have emerged by establishing different agencies has been mentioned several
times above. In the late 1950's and early 1960's, it became apparent, however,
that conflicts between these various agencies were causing as many issues to
emerge as were being resolved by the individual agencies. Once again, pro-
posals were made to create agencies to resolve these new problems, but this
time they were in the form of overall regulating and coordinating agencies
which were beginning to look much more like regional governments. The first
major proposal, made in 1961, was for a Golden Gate Transportation Commission,
to merge existing bridge and port facilities under one agency. While the
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proposal itself did not pass, it had one important effect. Local city and
county governments, fearing the imminent reduction of their own powers with
the establishment of such a regional agency, banded together into the
voluntary Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), the first of its kind
in the country.
ABAG was formally organized only for the discussion of mutual
problems and had no powers over its members. It has played the role in the
region of advocating the interests of local governments in any discussion of
regional government (and in fact fought to defeat the Golden Gate proposal).
Thus, when the city of Berkeley proposed the establishment of a separate,
stronger regional planning agency, ABAG voted to assume the duties of such an
agency and received funds from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development to do just that. ABAG also played a major role in establishing
and guiding the Bay Area Transportation Study Commission, a comprehensive
study of-highway and transit development in the region funded by various
federal and state agencies. Eventually, ABAG was designated as the A-95
clearinghouse for review of all federally funded projects in the region.
However, ABAG still held few real powers and couldn't resolve major
issues effectively. When, in 1963 and 1964, filling of the Bay and the need
to conserve the Bay emerged as major regional issues, ABAG was split on what
action should be taken to protect the Bay. Some of its members, still seeking
to increase their tax bases by taking advantage of Bay filling opportunities,
effectively blocked ABAG from taking any actions in support of restrictions
on such fillings. In place of ABAG action, the state legislature established
a study commission on Bay filling in 1964 and the Bay Conservation and
Development Commission (BCDC) in 1965. BCDC was given power to restrict
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Bay filling through permit issuance and charged with preparing a plan for
the continuing protection of the Bay by 1969. Thus, with ABAG unable to act,
the region's de facto government in the state legislature established the first,
if somewhat temporary, portion of a regional government.
Building on this base, the movement for regional government advanced.
In 1967, the legislature convened a joint Committee on Bay Area Regional
Organization (BARO), made up of representatives from the Bay Area. This group
was charged with studying the region's problems and need for regional
government and making recommendations on a government plan. In their deli-
berations, it became evident quite rapidly that the new agency would have
to have some form of regulatory or controlling powers to effectively govern
the region. But two key issues remained. First, the question of how
representation in the new organization would be structured was paramount.
Regional organizations, such as the League of Women Voters and the Bay Area
Council (a business group) strongly supported direct election of representatives
from districts within the region. The NAACP, fearing a severe loss of rower
for minority groups if decisions shifted from a local to regional level, also
argued for direct representation to ensure some black representation. ABAG,
on the other hand, expressed fears of loss of local control and supported
constituent representation; the system by which ABAG's policy body was
chosen (i.e., representatives appointed by local city and county governments).
Within ABAG, however, opinions varied. Contra Costa and Marin counties
both strongly supported the ABAG position, as did Alameda County, but San
Francisco was not very pleased with the effectiveness of an ABAG type agency.
The second key issue involved what types of problems a regional
agency could deal with. BCDC advanced a proposal with mixed representation
for a multi-functional regional government, including the functions of BCDC.
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The BATS commission also proposed a regional government scheme, with a
powerful metropolitan transportation authority (for both planning and
operating all transportation in the region) as one nart. Ultimately, BARO
proposed a directly elected government with broad powers in: transportation,
environmental quality, regional parks and open space, Bay conservation and
development and planning for public and private utilities. The government,
which had to be approved by a regional referendum, would have had especially
broad powers in apportioning state highway funds within the region.
However, agreement on full scale regional government was not easily
reached. ABAG made its own home rule proposal which would have established
ABAG itself as a regional government and generally opposed the BARO plan.
In the state legislature, in 1969', the BARO plan was vigorously and effective-
ly opposed, primarily by Senator Collier, an advocate for the State Highway
Commission, by the freeway lobby, and by Governor Reagan, in response to
these other groups. The fear was that local control over State Highway Fund
allocations would effectively undermine the State Highway Commission's
authority in this and other regions of the state. As a result, the proposals
for large scale regional government, even when amended in subsequent sessions,
have not yet found substantial support. Certain portions of such a govern-
ment have, however, been enacted. BCDC, originally intended to expire in
1969, has been permanently extended as a state funded agency with local and
regional policy direction. The Metropolitan Transportation Commission has
also been established.
Despite the lack of implementation of regional government proposals,
the dynamics of proposal initiation and change point out or elaborate impor-
tant aspects of the Bay Area's political context. First, it is evident that
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several broad regional interest groups have emerged. Business, which in
BART's early days took the form of downtown businessmen's associations,
has evolved into a regional advocate for efficient, good government (the
Bay Area Council), joining established groups such as the League of Women
Voters. Conservation interests, such as the Sierra Club, have succeeded in
developing a regional conservation agency (BCDC) which now serves as a
regional voice for conservation issues. Even black groups, in the form of the
NAACP, have maintained a voice in the ongoinq debate.
A second aspect of the Bay Area's political context illustrated
above is the strongly defensive behavior exhibited by local governments in the
debate over regional government. While ABAG seems to recognize (at least
after the pressure of the past 7 'years) the need for strong and effective
regional government in several priority areas (including housing and sewage
disposal, which are not in the BARO proposal) and also seeks to absorb
related regional agencies into such a government (e.g., the Ray Area Air
Pollution Control District), ABAG strongly fears control of such a government
by directly elected representatives. If that were to occur, the risks of
local governments losing long held powers to a regional government would be
high. Despite differences among ABAG members (i.e., rural and suburban
counties seem to fear regional government more than the urban core counties),
the local government voice in deciding upon a regional government decision-
making structure has apparently been quite effective in opposing other than
their own proposals.
A final aspect of the Bay Area's political context which is further
elaborated by the regional government debate is the nature of the political
dynamics of the region's de facto regional forum, the state legislature. The
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establishiment of the special regional joint committee was a clear case of
the legislature allowing the Bay Area to work out and propose its own regional
government solution; and debate by regional legislators was most probably
influenced by their ties to particular regional interest groups (e.g., local
governments, conservation groups). But in this case, defeat of the BARO
proposal was apparently predicated as well upon the opposition of the state
freeway lobby to the transportation portion of the bill (because it gave
control of highway funds within the region to the new government). Randolph
Collier, a Senator from two of the Bay Area's counties (Sonoma and Napa),
was, at the time, the powerful chairman of the Senate Transportation Committee.
Thus, power he had acquired within the Senate on statewide issues, when
applied to opposing a Bay Area regional government bill, could be much more
effective in the state legislature than the power of the other Bay Area
representatives which was based largely on their own constituencies. State-
wide issues and the power of one person involved in those issues could
therefore prevent the Bay Area from establishing a regional government and
making regionwide decisions.
* * * * *
The Metropolitan Transportation Commission is Born 17
As was apparent in the discussion of the Bay Area's debate over
regional government, transportation planning and development has figured
heavily in Bay Area regional politics. The establishment of the Bay Area
Rapid Transit District and the 1961 proposal for a Golden Gate Transportation
Commission provided early impetus to the discussion. In the later 1960's,
the general discussion of regional government proposals and the specific pro-
posals of the Bay Area Transportation Study Commission (BATSC) continued the
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debate. In 1968, BATSC proposed a Metropolitan Transportation Authority to
operate or control bridges, highways, rapid transit, bus and street car
systems in the nine-county Bay Area. If regional government were to be
established, the Authority would be merged into it (until that time, its
board would consist of 18 representatives appointed by each of the
state legislative representatives from the Bay Area and 7 representatives
appointed by ABAG). One encouragement to such a development was an apparent
shifting in attitude within the Reagan administration to allow a larger
measure of regional control over highway construction. This was also aided
by the movement of Senator Collier to the chairmanship of the Senate
Finance Committee, thereby taking him out of direct control of the Transporta-
tion Committee which would have to endorse such a bill. Also, the void in
overall transit planning and decision-making in the region, which hindered
the development of a well-planned transit system to compete with the
region's highway system, necessitated the development of some such structurC.
Without good transit and highway planning, the federal government, through
the Federal Highway Administration and the Urban Mass Transportation Admini-
stration, was threatening at the time to reduce federal funding to the Bay
Area (or provide none at all).
But major proposals such as that by BATSC ran into opposition from
BART, Golden Gate Highway Bridge and Transportation District, and AC, who
didn't want to be taken over by another group (as well as from local
governments who feared a major new regional entity out of their control).
Despite support of such proposals by several Bay Area legislators and
apparent disenchantment with the management capabilities of BART in the
legislature, the powerful Authcrity concept was not approved.
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It remained for John Foran, a member of the Assembly Transportation
Committee from San Francisco, to propose a modified Metropolitian Transporta-
tion Commission (MTC), which would have planning and veto power over major
transit development in the region and would suggest priorities for highway
development by the State Highway Commission. The board was to be made up of
appointed representatives of various county and city governments. In its
composition the bill reflected a series of compromises. First, control was
by constituent representation, the procedure which ABAG supported, rather than
direct election. Second, the state maintained final decision authority on
highway priorities in cases of "overriding statewide significance." Third,
the agency would not operate transit or highways but would seek to
coordinate existing agencies. Nonetheless, MTC was a quite powerful agency
and to support its activities, the bill provided that ABAG money for trans-
portation planning would be transferred to MTC. It wculd also be nerqed
with any broader regional government should that be established.
ABAG opposed the bill, but not very strongly as it reflected a
transportation agency which local governments could control. The Governor
and the state Business and Transportation Agency, on the advice of the
Governor's Task Force on Transportation, strongly supported the bill. The
freeway lobby did not oppose it and the bill nearly sailed through the
legislature in one session. In September, 1970, the Metrcpolitan
Transportation Commission was created.
The establishment of MTC further confirms some of the observations
made about the Bay Area debate on reqional government. The Bay Area could
establish a regional transportation agency but only if first, the decision
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structure of the agency was closer to that which ABAG desired (i.e., con-
stituent representation) rather than direct election and if, second, state-
wide interests in highway development would not be fully deleted from the
decision process. In addition, the pressures from AC transit, Golden Gate
Transit and BART to maintain their autonomy were apparently heeded in
developing the bill. These independent stances, it would seem, will play a
major role in the ongoing attempts by MTC to coordinate these various agencies.
* * * * *
Developing a Regional Transportation Plan18
The Metropolitan Transportation Commission was established with
broad planning and decision-making authority over Bay Area transportation
development. But MTC's enacting legislation specified that:
"66508. The commission shall adopt, by June 30, 1973, a regional
transportation plan for the region. Prior to the adoption of
such a plan, the operation, construction and modification of
those transportation systems under the purview of the commission
may be undertaken without the approval of the commission."
In other words, MTC really couldn't begin to coordinate the Bay
Area's transportation system until it had a plan. In addition, the plan was
supposed to include both a specific 10 year multi-modal schedule of
project priorities and a financial plan. But MTC was a brand new agency
(which didn't really get started until mid-1971) and the process of building
a staff and developing a planning process could not be done quickly (after all,
it took BATSC five years to develop its transportation plan). Further, MTC
would have to be careful in developing regional transportation priorities
for fear of angering one or more agencies whose cooperation they might later
seek (and who where initially contributing some of the money and staff to
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support MTC).
With these difficulties in mind, MTC took over the transportation
planning activities from ABAG (ABAG quickly became closely tied to MTC:
the Commission's chairperson was Joe Bort, an active member of ABAG from
Oakland, and MTC set up offices in the same building with ABAG). The Commission
held seven meetings in late 1971 and early 1972 to discuss the general aspects
of plan development (e.g., financing, environmental aspects, travel demands,
population projections). However, this more theoretical process was soon
bypassed by pragmatic concerns for getti.ng a plan developed. According to one
of the key planners with MTC at the time, much of the actual 'planning' was
done in a very short time (8 months). This involved collecting intended
programs of improvement from the 'various agencies in the region (e.g., the
Division of Highways, BART) and piecing. those together to identify where
conflicts and opportunities for coordination existed and what the total cost
of all the proposals was. MTC then stimulated community discussion of the
identified conflicts and issues (e.g., environmental impact, the priorities
for different improvements) in various portions of the region. Out of this
rapid process came a plan which consisted of (1) broadly stated policies which
were heavily pro-transit (i.e., oriented toward reducing overdependence on
the automobile); (2) a facilities 'plan' which basically identified issues and
categorized particular projects as I. "committed," II. "recommended for
further study," III. "an issue is recognized," IV. "not included in the plan
at this time;" (3) a series of program elements (e.g., transit fare coordina-
tion projects) aimed at improving transit service; and (4) a set of priorities
and financial plan which were very optimistic in the projection of funds which
would be available and very loose in setting any actual project priorities.
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In essence, the regional transportation plan was a "plan to plan"
which had attempted to identify what planning needed to be done for further
transportation development without specifying what would be built before the
identified issues were resolved (very few projects were in the "committed"
category). This loose structure evolved from three factors: (1) the short
time available for any definitive analysis (if it could be done at all) which
would determine regional priorities, (2) the need on the part of MTC to not
anger the different agencies which would be implementing the plan at this
early stage of MTC's existence, and (3) the related feelings of MTC's
director and executive director, and the chairman of the commission, that an
absolute master plan would not guide regional transportation development
any better than their loose plan ,because the issues they had identified would
have to be resolved before implementation anyway and how they would he
resolved could not be clear until each was directly addressed.
Of these reasons, the latter two clearly played a more important
role in shaping the plan. The interests of the major agencies played a role
in establishing what projects were to be in which categories. For example,
the original staff recommendations for categorization were shifted so that
19 projects from categories 3 and 4 were shifted up to category 2 by the
commission, with the feeling that these projects had only one or two minor
issues to be resolved before implementation could proceed (as opposed to the
staff's feelings, based on rough transportation and environmental analysis,
that these should not be considered so close to implementation). Also, an
explicit scheme of priorities was added to suggest the importance of particu-
lar projects but this was not an actual schedule of improvements. The advocacy
of a still relatively loose plan by the commission's top personnel did succeed
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in keeping such recategorization from turning the plan into a rigid master
plan, and thereby allowed the Commission to keep the great majority of its
options open for dealing with transportation issues as they arose in the
region.
One interesting aspect of MTC's plan development was community
involvement in the planning process. Fifteen 'town meetings' (and four
official public hearings held 2 weeks before June 30, 1973) were held as
the plan was being developed to seek community reactions to the proposed
planning format and to identify issues which might arise from implementation
of particular portions of the plan. The communities' comments are as
interesting for what they suggest about the dynamics of transportation
politics in the Bay Area as for their substantive content. First, two
regional groups, the Sierra Club and the League of Women Voters took an
active role in commenting on the plan, taking extensively researched positions
at meetings throughout the region. Second, the largest single category
of community comments had to do with specific project issues with local
officials and real estate interests often taking positions in favor of a pro-
ject and environmental groups and social action groups (e.g., La Raza Unida,
NAACP) protesting the negative impacts of particular projects. Third, a
large number of comments provided general support of the overall policy
statements of MTC in favor of transit, emphasizina growing concern in the
region for transit development rather than highway development. Fourth, a
number of comments questioned the consideration of social and environmental
issues in the plan, and suggested the need for an environmental impact report
before the plan was officially adopted. One interesting aspect of this
environmental concern was the diversity of interests expressed for encouraging
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growth (e.g., Solano County), and discouraging it (e.g., Marin County) in
the different portions of the region.
Thus the MTC, in developing a regional transportation plan,
developed a general pro-transit policy position, but shied away from
developing that position into an explicit master plan for development, in
part in deference to existing transit and highway agencies in the region
whose cooperation MTC would have to seek in later attempts to coordinate
regional transportation development and in part out of a feeling that many
project issues would arise which would quickly invalidate any master plan
and that therefore, the most desirable stance for MTC was a flexible one. In
developing the plan, MTC had identified project related environmental issues
but the lack of a systematic envi'ronmental impact report was criticized
widely by the community (and Bay Area members of the state legislature as
well). MTC's planning efforts, therefore, now have to respond to this
criticism if 'MTC is to maintain credibility in the region. Perhaps the most
important issue not treated by the plan was the question of financial priori.-
ties for the development of transit and highways. While M4TC's open-ended
plan allowed for resolving specific funding proposal issues as they came up,
some of these issues (most notably decisions on extensions of BART lines and
possible future transfers of highway funds to transit development) might
require a better structured and more comprehensive approach to recognizing
the budgetary interdependence between projects. Nonetheless, MTC's plan was
adopted, allowing the commission to begin to fill its fuller role as a
regional decision-making body for transportation issues.
* * * * *
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Air Quality and the Freeways 1 9
In conjunction with state and regional agencies, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (acting under the U.S. Clean Air Act of 1970)
has been developing transportation control plans for metropolitan areas with
high pollution levels, to attempt to reduce the number of vehicle miles travel-
led in the regions and thereby reduce transportation's contribution to
regional air pollution. Where local authorities have not developed plans
to the EPA's liking, as in the Bay Area, EPA has taken upon itself to pro-
mulgate plans which drastically reduce central city parking capacity, which
encourage transit improvements and which restrict further highway development.
In the Bay Area, as elsewhere, local officials have strongly
agreed with the improvement of regional air quality but strongly protested
the severity of the economic impact likely to occur from the EPA plan.
Environmental groups such as the Bay Area Sierra Club and the San Francisco
Ecology Center have supported the plan. While it is unlikely that all of the
strict provisions of the plan will ever be implemented, efforts to develop
better planning tools for air quality have been initiated by the California
Department of Transportation (incorporating the former Division of Highways),
BART and MTC. Further, the EPA pressure has resulted in some planning efforts
for express bus lanes, carpooling and other incentives to reduce vehicle travel.
In one particular respect, the EPA has significantly affected,
at least for the time being, the proposed expansion of Interstate 580, a free-
way in the Livermore Valley which connects the agricultural land of California's
central valley to the harbors of the Bay Area. Between 1964 and 1969, the
State Division of Highways developed olans to expand the existing four lane
1-580 to eight lanes to accomodate growing truck and commuter traffic through
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the Livermore Valley. In 1970, however, a proposal to modify the original
design to include space for the possible eventual construction of a BART
extension in the median delayed implementation. As a result of this delay,
the project became subject to the requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act and therefore had to submit an environmental impact statement (EIS)
to the Federal Highway Administration before construction could proceed. In
1971, a draft EIS of roughly 50 pages was prepared which included one general
paragraph on the air quality impacts of the proposal. After much concern was
expressed, however, over the growth-inducing impacts of the proposal and the
related increase in vehicle miles travelled and air pollution in the Livermore
corridor (which had one of the worst levels of air quality in the Bay Area),
the EIS was redrafted in 1973 toinclude a large study of air pollution impacts
(but one, unfortunately, which was limited in its methodology).
At this point, MTC had adopted its regional plan and it had to
approve the 1-580 project before the Division of Highways could present the
proposal to the FHWA. In MTC discussions with the community, the proposal
was widely supported by commuter groups, homebuilders, businessmen, several
local governments and the Alameda County Department of Public Works. A
widened Route 580 had been a part of local general plans for a number of years
and these would all have to be redone if it wasn't built. In addition, it was
argued that traffic congestion on the road was getting very bad, and would
likely get worse. Very few local groups opposed the road and the largest
opponent appeared to be the Bay Area Sierra Club. MTC voted to approve the
project with Chairperson Joe Bort (a supervisor from Alameda County) citing
the dependency of local plans upon its completion but with some environmental
groups criticizing the general bias which the county supervisors on "ITC had
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toward any new public works construction as a necessary and valid investment.
However, MTC was to be overruled in this case. In the Council on
Environmental Quality, the federal qroup which oversees the implementation of
the National Environmental Policy Act, the EPA persuaded the Secretary of
Transportation to direct the Federal Highway Administration to reject the
project's EIS because it lacked adequate air quality information. The project's
implementation is for the time being, therefore, dependent upon the region's
development of adequate traffic forecasting and air quality prediction
techniques, despite MTC's official support of the proposal.
This case illustrates two important points. First, in the absence
of strong local opposition, NTC voted to support a major highway expansion
project despite its alleged interest in increased emphasis on transit in the
region. However, the proposal had strong local support from residents of the
area and did include the possibility of transit development. Therefore,
support of the proposal did appear to be responsive to the interests of a
particular portion of the region. Also, the Livermore population is not a large
portion of the Bay Area and the regionwide impacts of satisfying these Liver-
more interests, as long as the money for the road is specifically allocated
to interstate highway construction and cannot be transferred to other uses,
are likely to be small.
The second point concerns the interesting interjection into the
debate of more purely technical concerns about air quality impacts by a
federal agency. This was not the first case of federal intervention in the
Bay Area (in the Junipera Serra dispute, the Federal Highway Administrator
openly supported the San Francisco side of the case), but it does reflect
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the continued presence of the federal government as an actor in Bay Area
affairs. In fact, the federal government has had a 15 year history of
requiring planning efforts in the Bay Area (and elsewhere) before federal funds
for transportation improvements could be allocated (e.g., the 3-C process for
transportation planning, the Unified Work Program for transportation planning).
Despite the Junipero Serra case, most of this intervention has been done from
the perspective of the impartial technical actor interested in ensuring that
an adequate planning process was developed. However, the actions of the
federal actors clearly have influenced the nature and outcomes of planning and
decision-making for transportation in the Bay Area.
* * * * *
Freeways, (cont.)20
The strong early reactions in the urban portions of the Bay Area
against the construction of costly highways and against the people responsible
for those highways (the California Highway Commission and Division of Highways),
have continued to shape transportation politics in the Bay Area. Resentment
among regional leaders of state level decision-makina on regional highways
and desires for increased support of transit improvements have spurred the
region's discussion of regional government and the establishment of 1TC. MTC,
in its regional plan, clearly presented an orientation toward transit (even
though it was somewhat vague) and toward reducing regional overdependence on
the automobile.
The Bay Area has not been alone in these feelings towards state
highway developers in California and, in late 1972, the California legislature
transformed the State Department of Public Works into the California Depart-
ment of Transportation (CALTRANS), with a governor-appointed State Transpor-
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tation Board and with Divisions of Mass Transportation and Transportation
Planning. In some respects the change was one of name, not of substance: the
Division of Highways still had some 16,000 employees (the Division of Mass
Transportation had 22) and they and the California Highway Commission still
had control of the large state highway trust fund (very few similar funds for
transit were available).
Nonetheless, a certain change of attitude has begun to take place.
District offices are now Transportation (rather than Highway) districts and
the CALTRANS enabling legislation directed the newly created Division of
Transportation Planning to carry out the development of a statewide transpor-
tation plan. Regional plans are being developed by the local Councils of
Governments or regional planning-agencies unless they have specifically
asked the CALTRANS districts to prepare them. The State plan will incorporate
the regional plan and schedule of improvement priorities except where issues
of "statewide interregional interest" were not addressed by the regions. Once
regional and state plans are adopted, the California Highway Commission is
supposed to follow the priorities set by the regional plans. Prior to the
official establishment of formal regional priorities, the CALTRAIS districts
are attempting to formally involve the COG/RPA's in setting highway
priorities (through review and comment on the Division of Highway's existing
technical priority list).
In the Bay Area, where MTC already has a 'plan' and is supposed to
be setting priorities, the CALTRANS district, long considered a villain, has
taken a low profile in influencing MTC priorities. However, the state has
not fully abandoned its role as highway advocate. The technical list prepared
by the CALTRANS investment programming staff is quite sophisticated, and the
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projects in it have already had many years of planning done on them. While
some projects are now being dropped or reduced in scope because costs have
escalated and state highway funds could not build all of them, the state's
list of possible projects clearly defines the only projects using highway
funds which will be on the region's agenda in the near future. Any new
projects would require planning lead time of several years, state highway
funds are not now available for transit development and 1TC's planning and
programming capabilities are just now beginning to equal those of the
CALTRANS districts. But even within these constraints,- it is likely that
priorities among these projects will be the responsibility of MTC. This
responsibility, along with increasing technical sophistication as it becomes
better established, should make MTC the primary regional decision-making
authority on highway development. Two recent issues illustrate the potential
and the problems of this role.
Construction of Route 24 (the Grove Shafter Freeway) in Oakland
has been subject to major controversy for some time now. But despite the con-
troversy, everything but a short final section has been completed. For this
piece, the controversy has intensified. The road is a major component of a
proposed redevelopment project in downtown Oakland and local officials
strongly support its construction. If not for their support and their
strong pressure on CALTRANS, the local CALTRANS district apparently would see
little real system importance to building the link and might not ask for high
priority for it. On the other side, the redevelopment project and the road
will likely cause major relocation of black residents of Oakland and community
groups have been strongly opposing it. MTC, in its regional plan, named the
link as of high system importance and placed it in Category II (to be placed
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in Category I if relocation problems are solved). Thus the issue revolves
around a conflict of two groups within the same community and it is really
much broader than transportation alone. MTC has an opportunity to ensure
that community objections are resolved (i.e., to play overseer to the local
political process) and has apparently opted not to commit itself beforehand
to a decision. But ITC has authority only over transportation, and the roots
of this issue go beyond transportation so that MTC's real jurisdiction may
be very limited. The case also illustrates that local officials (e.g., from
the Oakland city government), who make up MTC's board, may be promoting
positions on issues which are opposed by large minorities of their consti-
tuency. To a certain extent, this brings into question the responsiveness
of MTC's board to these minorities on other issues as well.
A second issue which MTC currently faces is the proposed construction
of the Napa River Bridge. Questions have been raised by environmentalists
about the growth-inducing impacts of construction and the unnecessary
duplication of existing bridges in the area which the construction might
occasion. In the staff recommendations the bridge was placed in category IV
but before adoption of the plan, it was moved to category II. It so happens
that the bridge is to be named for the powerful Senator Collier and, although
he is no longer chairman of the Senate Transportation Committee, he is now
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. According to top MTC personnel, he
has threatened to hold up any state funds for MTC (now a sizable portion of
their funding) if the bridge is not approved. It appears that MTC will now
approve the bridge without further study. Two points should be made: first,
it is not uncommon for state legislator's opinions on transportation projects
to hold considerable authority but second, it anpears that in this case author-
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ity is tied to the legislator's statewide power and not so much to his local
constituency.
* * * * *
Transit Extensions and Coordination21
The two key transit issues currently facing MTC are the decisions
on priorities for extension of BART and decisions on actions to coordinate
existing transit agencies. Both issues illustrate key aspects of the political
atmosphere in which MTC is operating.
For BART there are currently five extensions under consideration,
and MTC has to approve which extensions will he built. Four of them are in
areas within the current BART district (Livermore, Pittsbura-Antioch, Oakland
Airport, and Northwest San Francisco). One, the extension to San Francisco
Airport through San Mateo County, is not. BA/RT directors from Alameda and
Contra Costa counties would like to see those areas of their counties which
have been paying property taxes to support BART for 10 years without benefit
of BART service have first priority for extensions. They fear that MTC, under
the control of all nine counties (the six counties outside of BART have more
votes than the three within), will vote to extend BART outside the district to
San Francisco Airport and that San lateo County (which originally withdrew
from BART when initial construction meant very high taxes for the community)
would get service from the entire BART system for less than the cost of their
share of the total system. The San Mateo costs would be reduced even
further by the existence today of much higher federal subsidies (2/3 of cost)
for transit construction.
To head off an extension outside of the BART district, the East Bay
directors attempted to get the state legislature to curb MTC powers and to
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"freeze" BART extensions within the current BART district. But the de facto
Bay Area regional government in the legislature, responding to strong
objections to this freeze from San Francisco and San Mateo legislators,
defeated the proposal. Once again, a regional issue was decided in the
legislature, but this time, the decision was one to keep the actual extension
decision within the region by giving it to MTC to resolve.
MTC has its work cut out for it, for the issue is not simply one of
the BART counties vs the non-BART counties, but involves a deeper disagreement
between East and West Bay counties for regional priority and between Oakland
and San Francisco for access to their respective airnorts. Planning studies
are underway in all areas (they have been completed for the San Francisco
Airport extension) and the relative costs and revenues of each extension are
certain to play a role in the decision given BART's serious financial problems.
But the two major issues which will have to be resolved prior to an MTC
decision are (1) what is an equitable cost for "buying into" the BART system
for San Mlateo County and (2) is this sufficient to offset the cost to East
Bay areas where taxes have been paid but no BART service exists?
Beyond these extension issues, the central Bay Area (the three
BART counties) also has an existing transit systen (or rather, four systems--
AC, BART, Golden Gate, and MUil) and certainly one objective of any regional
government is the better coordination of existing services. In the past
three years, two major issues have come up, one concerning the coordination
of BART and AC service in the East Bay and across the Bay to San Francisco,
the other concerned with MTC's role in allocation of state transit funds
between BART and MUNI.
The BART-AC conflicts have a relatively long history. Both
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agencies participated in the Northern California Transit Demonstration
Project, an effort to plan for coordination of BART, AC and MUNI. AC
rerouted a number of its buses to provide better service to BART stations.
However, two issues have not been resolved. First, AC complains that BART
stations were largely designed for automobile access, not for buses, making
connections difficult for their passengers. Second, and more important,
BART and AC compete with one another for passengers on several routes, most
notably the routes across the Bay (which are currently very profitable for
AC). No fare sharing or unified share plan has yet been negotiated, raising
the possibility that AC will continue to operate across the Bay even after
BART begins service, thereby operating in direct and inefficient competition
for passengers.
Recognizing the severity of this problem, several oroups, including
the San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association (a professional
planning organization), suggested in 1971 that MTC should step in as mediator
to this dispute. In response MTC took two actions. First, it established
a Transit Coordinating Council as a forum for discussion of coordination
issues between transit operators. Top leaders of MTC suggest, however, that
they are not taking the lead role in this group, but merely bringing it
together. MTC's second response involved initiation of an AC/BART coordination
project. While this project is directing specific attention to the issues,
its first report, in January 1973, was nothing more than a broad identifica-
tion of the issues. In playing the role of mediator, MTC has taken a
cautious role in using its powers to bring the two large existing agencies
together.
The second transit dispute confirms M1TC's need to use its powers
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cautiously. The state legislature, in 1971, passed the Transportation
Development Act establishing a state sales tax collection to support transit
(or highways when no transit need exists). The money is intended to be spent
only in the county of its origin and most regional agencies can only review
and comment on claims made by transit agencies without any control over the
total amount of money to go to each county. But in the Bay Area (where the
total funds are $35 - $40 million annually), three overlapping agencies,
BART, MUNI and AC, vie for the funds from three counties (San Francisco,
Alameda and Contra Costa) and MTC not only reviews claims but also apportions
those monies between BART and AC and between BART and MUNI. Since the money
can be used for both construction and operating subsidies, this provision
gives MTC considerable official clout in shaping transit agency actions.
Within MTC, grants are reviewed by 4 staff members and a grant review
subcomnittee of the Commission. In 1973, the subcomnittee was made up of two
East Bay members and one from San Mateo. In preparing the allocations for
BART and MUNI, the committee voted 2-1 to give a substantial portion of the
funds for the next five years to BART for the addition of new cars. MUNI,
as was mentioned previously, is in continual need of financial aid to meet its
deficit and San Francisco officials were complaining that BART was not yet
even running in San Francisco and that therefore, San Francisco should not
have to sacrifice MUNI funds to pay for further BART expansion. Interestingly,
San Francisco (which holds four seats out of twelve on the BART Board of
Directors), got support on this issue from two East Bay members of the BART
board in part because the East Bay members wanted to be able to count on San
Francisco's support in the future when AC might need money. Ultimately, MUNI
and BART reached a compromise in which MUNI got more money and the whole MTC
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commission ratified the compromise.
In this issue of transit agency conflict, MTC served as a forum to
resolve the issue. MTC staff, using no technical information other than that
presented by the two agencies, had made a proposal to support the long range
goals of BART (with support from two East Bay commissioners). However, the
stronger interest expressed at the time was in keeping MUNI running. MTC
apparently responded to this stronger interest, and MUNI won a more satisfac-
tory settlement of the claims.
What arises out of these issues is a sense that MTC cannot simply
direct these transit agencies to coordinate on a sound technical basis but
that various MTC commissioners represent different interests in what
priorities for development of the regional transit system should be. Thus,
whether the issue is priorities on extensions, coordination or allocation of
state funds, the decisions MTC makes are likely to be colored by its members
and the interests they represent, and the power each of its members hold.
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D. Conclusion: Building an Understanding
This review of transportation and other issues in the Bay Area has
hardly been a complete one. But as the issues were discussed, various aspects
of the political context in which MTC is operating emerged. The task which
remains is the weaving together of the various threads of these difficult
issues so that a basic understanding of the political context in which planning
is being done can be developed. With this understanding, the planning director
of MTC would hopefully be able to organize the activities of the Commission s
planning staff to perform planning activities which complement the ongoing
political decision process.
Building this understanding requires the identification of three
facets of the Bay Area political dontext. First, the planning director must
identify the actors who play a role in regional decisions, the interests they
express and the resources they have to express those interests (i.e., political
power, technical assistance). This type of information is necessary if the
director intends to structure his or her agency so as to play the role proposed
in Chapter II of overseer to the political decision process (i.e., ensuring
that the interests of a wide range of groups are expressed in and considered
by the political decision process). Second, the processes by which issues
emerge in the Bay Area must be identified. In order to organize a planning
staff to provide technical information on issues as they emerge, the planning
director must be able to identify emerging issues at the earliest
possible time and to assess which actors in the region are likely to
initiate issues and which are likely to play reactive roles (i.e., reacting
to ensure that their interests are considered as issues are resolved).
Finally, the types of issues which emerge and the types of decision dynamics
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which govern the resolution of these issues should be identified by the
planning director. This knowledge provides (1) a guide to the technical
aspects of these issues which are considered in decisions and to the types
of technical analysis which should be performed by a planning staff and
(2) insights on which actors do have opportunities to have their interests
considered as issues are resolved, and which do not.
The Actors - The review of the issues suggests that there are a
number of actors who participate in the various regional issues and that they
express a diverse range of regional interests. The actors involved include
private interest groups, local governments and officials, members of the state
legislature and the various regional, state, and federal institutions with
special authority in the Bay Area. Different sets of these actors take part
in decisions at different levels (e.g., local officials and community
interest groups at local levels, local officials and regional interest groups
at regional levels). For different decisions there will be different
official decision-makers, and the issues reviewed above suggest that the
responsiveness of these sets of decision-makers (e.g., the legislature or
local governments) to the various private interest groups is not always
complete. Briefly, the major sets of actors are:
Local and Regional Interest Groups - Five sets of interest groups
have been involved in the various issues. First, business interests,
who in earlier years played a major role in support of BART and freeway
development, continue to support improved transportation facilities which
provide better service to their firms (e.g., central city interests in good
BART service, regionwide interest in good highway service). They have
emerged, as well, as vigorous regional advocates of directly elected,
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efficient regional government. Second, labor interests, particularly in the
construction unions, have expressed strong support for capital construction
of highway and rail transit systems which provides employment. Third,
conservation and environmental interests have been building at the local and
regional level. At the local level early opposition to freeways (e.g., the
Embarcadero) has continued through to today (the Napa River Bridge). This
has been aided by federal environmental impact statement requirements (and
similar California ones) and pressure from the U.S. EPA for improvement of
air quality. At the regional level, these groups have been particularly
effective in establishing the BCDC as a regional environmental advocate.
Fourth, social action interests (e.g., black and Chicano community groups,
the NAACP, etc.) have played a role in the urban areas of the region. On
local freeway issues (e.g., the Ashby Freeway, the Grove-Shafter Freeway) they
have been effective local opponents. But in regional transit decisions (i.e.,
the commuter orientation of BART) they apparently have been bypassed to a
certain extent. Some groups (e.g., NAACP) have actively entered into the
debate on regional government to assert their interest in protecting represen-
tation for minorities in a regional government. While this issue has not been
fully settled, the establishment of MTC with a board made up of local govern-
ment officials and not guaranteeing minority representation suggests that they
have been less than successful. A fifth active regional group has been the
Bay Area League of Women Voters, most often advocating the principles of
"good government." While their influence has not appeared to be great, they
have played the role of identifying key issues and bringing them into the
general public discussion to ensure, somewhat, the comprehensiveness of that
discussion.
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Local Governments and Officials - As was suggested in the introduc-
tion on metropolitan political cultures, local governments (cities and counties)
often both desire greater regional autonomy from state level decision-making
and fear loss of local power to any formal regional decision-making body
unless they have control of it. In the Bay Area, local governments, by
organizing ABAG and advocating constituent representation in regional
government, have maintained a significant amount of control over regional
decision-making bodies (e.g., MTC and ABAG as the land use planning agency).
But the various issues suggest that this unified defensive stance does not
imply unified interests. Certain clear distinctions arise, most notably the
split between urban and rural areas, with urban areas expressing desires
for strong regional commuter transit to maintain their economic importance
in the region and often opposing freeway construction in the city itself, and
with rural areas expressing conservative worries about rising tax rates
and generally supporting freeway construction. Also, the competition between
San Francisco and Oakland for allocation of new monies to spur urban growth
(i.e., the airport access issue) can (and has) raised further conflicts of
interest between local governments. Finally a significant difference exists
in attitudes toward growth and environmental concerns. Both the inability of
ABAG to act on Bay filling policy (caused by a split in ranks) and the more
recent pro-growth (Solano County) and anti-growth (Marin County) attitudes
expressed at MTC public hearings indicate the diversity of interests represented
by local governments. MTC, with a board made up of local government officials
in the Bay Area, is somewhat more likely to respond primarily to the business
interests in their communities and resolution of regional differences by MTC may
not always reflect the interests of the diverse segments of the community.
98
Special Agencies and Districts - In several cases the Bay Area
pattern of developing special purpose regional or subregional agencies to
resolve particular issues has been identified. In addition, the state
maintains two major special purpose agencies in the area, the Toll Bridge
Administration and the local CALTRANS district. Each of these agencies has
responsibility for part (or part of one part) of the regional transportation
system (or water or sewer systems in other cases). While they primarily play
an implementation role (i.e., constructing and operating BART or the highway
system) they have, in the absence of any regional planning, their own extensive
planning activities and priorities for improvement. While the current
separation of highway funding from transit funding reduces the number
of conflicts between modal agencies, the competition for funding and transit
coordination problems between agencies are often quite severe. Each agency,
once established, develops its own identity based on its single purpose
(some call this tunnel vision) and while they often succeed in getting things
accomplished, in doing so, they themselves become new interest groups in the
region. The problems these create are the type which MTC might well address
as a regional forum. But (1) some of the agencies, such as MUNI and BART,
are directed by the same local officials as those who sit on MTC, perhaps
giving them more access to the board than AC transit or the CALTRANS district,
and (2) some of the issues clearly involve priorities for expansion of transit
service outside of the existing districts and MTC, which has a majority of its
counties without major transit service, may not be the best forum to deal
equitably with new transit development.
State Legislators - As was illustrated many times above, the legis-
lature has served as a de facto regional government for the Bay Area. Legis-
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lators from the Bay Area (elected from 18 districts) are somewhat diverse in
their interests, and include several members of minority groups. As a result,
when the legislature as a whole allows this sub-group to develop its own
proposals for the Bay Area (or resolve conflicts which arise between Bay
Area legislators), they can be a relatively responsive and effective regional
decision body. But as we have seen, one state legislator, backed by the
powerful statewide freeway interests whom he has made his constituency, clearly
has had stronger influence on this group than the others. Through Senator
Collier, the oil and trucking interests who strongly support freeway develop-
ment and who have been angered by the Bay Area's negative attitude toward
highways, could therefore block any plan which gave the Bay Area absolute
control over freeway decisions within its region. Thus the nature of a
regional government body (MTC) and its ultimate powers were shaped by
statewide groups. In recent years, as the lobby has declined somewhat in
strength, MTC has, however, been established as a regional decision-making
forum to take over some of the role of the state legislature. But MTC is
dependent on the state legislature for its funding and therefore responsive
to the legislative delegation in two important ways. First, a legislator's
preferences on particular issues may hold considerable importance in MTC's
decision-making if they do not wish to anger the legislator. In Senator
Collier's case this is especially true. Second, when regional issues
emerge which MTC does not resolve to the satisfaction of all major interests,
these groups may go beyond MTC to the legislature (e.g., the BART extension
issue). While the legislature may not always overturn an MTC action, the
slightly broader representation of regional interests in the legislature
(i.e., for minorities) may provide an effective check on the responsiveness
of MTC decisions to the full set of regional interest groups.
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State and Federal Agencies - In addition to state agencies which
actually construct and operate Bay Area facilities (as mentioned above) a
number of state and federal agencies influence the process by which decisions
are made, the actors involved and the funding priorities within the Bay Area.
Both state and federal agencies have established extensive procedures for
environmental impact reporting and community participation which often help
bring out major social and environmental issues (e.g., air quality in Livermore).
Also, the federal A-95 review delegated to ABAG and the requirements for a
Unified Work Program (combining all transportation planning funds for the
region) have created pressures for increased coordination. Now, the federal
government is moving further in not allowing highway construction until air
quality concerns have been addressed, and also not allowing the region to get
2/3 federal funding for transit until MTC has developed a 10 year priority
plan for improvements. Thus the majority of the state and federal interven-
tions have dealt with shaping the process from an impartial technical point
of view. But major influence on regional transit and highway development also
has been exerted by the state and federal highway funds which provide
highway development to the area at no direct cost to the region (and which
cannot be used for other than highway purposes). However, this powerful
bias in funding for transportation may be ending as the Federal fund was
opened in 1973 to be partially used for transit, as other federal and state
transit funds have been made available and as the California highway fund
has recently been opened up.
The Issues - One key aspect of the transportation issues character-
istic of the Bay Area is that the Bay Area does have a well developed highway
and transit system and that therefore, the focus of the region's transport
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issues is on completing the last few segments of the system, developing
extensions (rail and highway) to less developed areas, coordinating the
various parts of the existing system and maintaining the system.
The review above suggests some idea of how this more limited set
of transport issues is likely to emerge in the area. Above all, the issues
will be somewhat constrained by those which existing agencies have put on
their agenda. The CALTRANS district, with its continuing priority list for
highway improvements and backlog of planned routes ready for implementation,
will certainly define, at least for the near future, %hat highway projects
can actively be considered. Similarly, BART, AC, MUNI and Golden Gate have
all defined continuing transit capital improvement programs. But it
is highly unlikely that the funds' available to the region over the next
10 to 20 years for transportation improvement will cover the costs of
all of these projects, and so there remains a role for MTC to play in identi-
fying issues which are raised by these different projects, resolving these
issues and setting priorities among the various projects.
The region, from the review above, apparently goes about identifying
these issues in several different ways. First, as with Rt. 580, or Rt. 24
or the extensions of BART to different parts of the region, issues are
likely to emerge into the regional decision arena as a result of strongly
expressed local interests (i.e., in building, or opposing, a highway project,
or in seeking committment to extend within the BART district before extending
outside it). In some cases, consideration is spurred by special funding
which has been set aside for the project (e.g., Interstate funds for 1-580)
or by interest from a particularly powerful regional actor (e.g., Senator
Collier and the Napa River Bridge). In essence, though, a process of various
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private interest groups and local officials expressing their interests and
lobbying for action or no action has been in existence for some time.
A second source of issues are the various special institutional
interest groups which have emerged in the region. For example, the CALTRANS
district, identifying what it sees as a necessary improvement in a highway,
will prepare planning studies and an environmental impact statement, hold public
hearings and seek approval of the project from MTC. Or AC transit will
protest that its interest in providing good quality bus service in the East
Bay will not be served by BART's unwillingness to coordinate its stations with
AC buses and its reluctance to share revenues from the profitable trans-bay
service. Special authorities, each with their own boards of directors (the
State Highway Commission in the CALTRANS case), are expressing their interests
and seeking to have them served by the political process.
Finally, issues will emerge in the yearly round of funding allocations
which MTC oversees. In highways, (where funding is now predominantly separate
from transit) the annual priority setting process for highway projects regularly
raises highway issues. In transit, MTC's decision authority on allocations
of state Transportation Development Act funds as well as its approval
authority on transit agency applications to the federal Urban Mass Transporta-
tion Administration for funds (the total amount of which are limited), also
requires resolution of transit improvement priority issues. These include, as
in the case of MUNI and BART, decisions on the support of improved regional
rail transit as opposed to the support of local intra-city transit. If, as
appears to be the case, highway funds are increasingly made available for transit
(if the region decides to use them that way) the funding issues are likely to
expand in number and in intensity (e.g., if BART and the CALTRANS District
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are both seeking approval of major construction projects with the same
limited funds).
Political Dynamics of Issue Resolution - Two Bay Area regional
forums for transportation decisions have been identified. The state legisla-
ture, particularly the Bay Area delegation, has served as a regional government
on many issues. In most cases, their deliberations reflect a fairly full
range of regional views. But in some, the power of certain Bay Area personali-
ties in the state as 'a whole can strongly influence Bay Area action. In
recognition, in part, of this state control of regional decisions, the area
sought and obtained approval to establish its own regional forum for transpor-
tation decisions, the MTC. MTCis made up of local government representatives
and has been established to resolve major regional issues.
The brief review of issues above suggests that four different types
of decisions will have to be made by MTC in resolving regional issues, and
that each will involve different types and numbers of actors with different
distributions of power. First, there are decisions where the issues being
addressed are essentially local. The Rt. 24 controversy in Oakland between
black community goups and business leaders and local government, where the
road does not have major regional significance, is an example of these. The
issues often involve many local concerns other than transportation (Black-
White relations, local economic development goals). But MTC is given a role
in such decisions because the funding for the road comes from the state and
they must decide on the priority of the issue's claim on regional funds (i.e.,
what other projects might use the funds and are eligible for them). Sometimes,
they may also be interested because a large local interest group (e.g., the
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black community in Oakland) has expressed an interest in the issue and is
not satisfied with the way it has been resolved locally. Issues of a primarily
local type are not likely to occur very often. When they do occur MTC can play
the role of ensuring that all local community interests have been adequately
considered, but where local government officials who sit on MTC are predominantly
supporting a position opposed by local minority groups, it may be that the other
local government officials who make up MTC will defer to their colleagues'
interests and ignore the interests of the minority groups.
A second set of decision are of a regional-local nature. Freeway
issues for major links fit into this category. Decisions to provide transit
funds to essentially local transit agencies (such as AC or MUNI) or to a more
regional agency such as BART are 'another example. Local interests may agree
on an issue (as in the MUNI case) or be split (as in many highway controversies
with pro- and anti- highway advocates) but other portions of the region
have a say in resolution of the issue. For example, in BART-MUNI, the entire
regional transit system would have to hold up purchase of new cars if San
Francisco is allowed to use a larger share of the transit funds allocated to
San Francisco for local transit. MTC can play a strong role as decision
forum for such an issue. However, the name 'regional-local' may be misleading.
In the BART-MUNI case, some portions of the broader 'region' supported San
Francisco (thereby helping San Francisco gain a favorable settlement) in return
for later support when they would be primary actors in a similar dispute.
Thus, there may be no major spokesperson for regionwide interests and local
goals will be supported in return for the same treatment at a later point.
In providing a forum for this kind of 'local-protection' political behavior,
(rather than bitter confrontations at public hearings between local groups and
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state or regional agencies) MTC may pave the way for development of a more
cooperative spirit among regional agencies and local actors. Decisions such
as these are likely to arise often as the need for resolution of conflicts
between local interests and regional and state interests continues.
A third form of decision, and perhaps the most common type, is
the intra-regional decision. This can take several forms: conflicts between
counties over BART extensions, conflicts between center city and suburbs
over setting aside regional highway funds for transit (should this become
feasible) or conflicts between environmental or social groups and business and
existing institutions over implementation of an air quality transportation
control plan or over the orientation of a regional rail transit system
(i.e., suburban commuter vs intracity). Basically, major regional interest
groups are expressing different concerns, desires and priorities for
transportation development. Where the conflict is between major regional
government actors (e.g., counties, BART and CALTRANS), MTC can play an effective
role as a forum for resolving the differences. But where the dispute is
between interest groups (e.g., environmentalists or social action groups and
local officials or business), MTC may provide a much better forum for the
latter interests than the former. These types of issues are likely to
occur often, as counties within MTC seek to maintain their own interests and
federal intervention (and increased public awareness) continue to bring
social and environmental issues to the fore.
Finally, a fourth set of decisions occurs, generally emanating
from within the region, but involving state and federal actors as well. Were,
for example, MTC to decide, under the 1973 Federal Highway Act, to try to
transfer funds intended for widening of Interstate 80 to the development of
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transit, MTC itself becomes an actor in the arena, advocating the region's
position with the California Highway Commission, the legislature and the
Federal government. In a recent example, the regional and state decision to
build 1-580 was overturned by federal pressure for better consideration of
air quality. While technical factors can play a role in such decisions, deci-
sions are more likely to be resolved by regional, state and federal legislators.
Decisions are also likely to be sensitive to how firmly committed to the
action MTC and the region are. But while the decisions are certainly
important, they are not likely to be numerous (there are limits on funding
transfers as well as on the powers of direct intervention of the federal
government). Nonetheless, MTC's role as regional advocate in such decisions
is an important one.
This assessment of the Bay Area's political context is somewhat
cursory, as the exact responsibilities and powers of all of the actors have
not been outlined, and their behavior in the whole range of possible issues
have not been fully reviewed. But based on the tentative conclusions above
on the Area's political context, several observations can be made about the
nature of regional decision-making and the role which planning information
has played and might play in decisions.
First, there are indications that the decision forum (MTC) as current-
ly structured, may tend to favor business and local government interests in
its decisions. As a result of federal and state impact reporting requirements
and the efforts of several regional interest groups (the League of Women
Voters, the Sierra Club), many environmental and social issues are now likely
to emerge in the region's decision process, but the groups who express the
strongest interest in these issues may not hold enough power to influence
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decisions or have access to the MTC decision-makers because the MTC
member's interests tend to be aligned with other regional groups. To a certain
extent, the more diverse 'back-up' regional government, the legislature, may
provide a good check on MTC's straying too far in favor of one group, but as
we have seen, this group too can be dominated by one set of interests. While
planners, except perhaps advocate planners for community groups, cannot hope
to significantly build any one group's power, they could play the role of
advocate for and supplier of information on social and environmental consider-
ations in transportation decisions. By developing well-balanced, sensible
information on social and environmental issues which can be easily grapsed,
planners might (1) provide information to make less powerful regional groups
aware of their stake in decisions 'and (2) promote environmental and social
considerations in their contacts with MTC decision-makers.
A second observation concerns the lack of 'neutral' information
for use in MTC decisions. Almost all of the information which is available
for use to guide complicated decisions on financial issues (e.g., AC-BART,
MUNI-BART or the CALTRANS Highway Program) is developed by the operating agen-
cies themselves and often represents many major, undocumented, apriori
assumptions about goals and objectives. A second task for the planner, then,
would be the sorting out of all this information to provide the decision-
maker with a clearer view of what the decisions are. This might involve, in
the near term, gaining access to the agencies' information, assessing the
differences between the ways in which the information is developed
and differences in the predicted outcomes, and summarizing this analysis for
the decision-maker. As MTC becomes better established, it may be possible
to work with the agencies to coordinate efforts to develop common bases for
analysis.
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A final observation concerns a major type of MTC decisions, the
intraregional decision. Often, the key questions here are what counties or
groups gain by a particular decision and which lose. Sometimes, as in the case
of the BART extensions, this requires complicated financial and travel
analysis. But the key factor here is not so much what the aggregate
regional effects of one or the other BART extensions will be, but what the
key benefits (e.g., reduced travel times, increased development) and the
key costs (e.g., increases in tax rate, loss of a chance for BART service)
will be for each county (or portion of a county). It is likely that regional
distributions of power will ultimately control which interest groups' views
will win out, but to establish their initial position on the issues, adequate
local information on the costs and benefits for each group may be useful.
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CHAPTER IV
THE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION:
ESTABLISHING A ROLE
A. Introduction: MTC and the Role of the Planner
It was suggested in Chapter II that the planner, in order to
play a more effective role in creating the linkage between knowledge and govern-
mental action, should organize his or her planning activities to guide the
ongoing set of decisions on public policy development and implementation. To
accomplish this the planner may not want to expend exorbitant amounts of
limited planning time and resourees on master planning activities, but might
.rather seek to make each incremental decision by the public decision-makers
the best possible decision that can be made at that time. The planner becomes
a sort of overseer for the political process, attempting to ensure that
decisions are as comprehensively considered as is possible, that all
affected groups are informed and encouraged to participate in decisions, and
that decisions reflect long range as well as short range considerations.
In taking on this role, the planner seeks to develop information which is
understandable to the decision makers on the implications for various interest
groups of a particular decision.
To carry out this role, the planner may play a staff role to a chief
executive or a broader decision-making forum (e.g., a city council), a 'neutral'
role financed by civic groups interested in good governmental decision-making
(e.g., the Passaic Valley citizens' Planning group in Rabinovitz1 , or the
League of Women Voters), or an advocate's role for a group with strong interests
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in a governmental action, but no well organized voice in decision-making.
While each of these is likely to be an important role, the first,
as staff for a chief executive or for a broader decision-making forum, is
likely to be the position with the most financial resources and the one (as
Walker and Kent have argued2) with the most opportunities for influencing
ongoing political decisions. Rabinovitz has pointed out that a staff role for
a chief executive, while potentially valuable when that actor holds power
and is seeking information from the planner on the long range and comprehensive
effects of decisions, can damage the planner's claim to objectivity and his
or her later effectiveness should the particular actor lose power.
Therefore, if one is seeking to shape planning activities to best link know-
ledge to governmental action with sufficient planning resources, it seems
most valuable to focus on the design of planning activities which best suit
the planner's role as staff to a broader decision-making forum.
The San Francisco Bay Area Metropolitan Transportation Commission
(MTC) provides an example of such a broader decision-making forum. To better
understand how the role concept for planners proposed in Chapter II could be
applied to organizing the planning activities of ITC, this chapter reviews
the specific roles which MTC was created to fill (i.e., through its enabling
legislation) and the type of role MTC has established for itself as it has
evolved. This review is based on documents prepared by MTC during the course
of its first three years of existence and on interviews with a variety of
MTC personnel.
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B. The Legislative Mandate
On September 16, 1970, California Governor Ronald Reagan signed into
law a bill creating the Metropolitan Transportation Commission in the San
Francisco Bay Area. 3 Established to "provide comprehensive regional transpor-
tation planning for the region," the Commission is made up of 14 representatives
appointed by city and county goverlnent, one each from the Association of Bay
Area Governments and the Bay Conservation and Development Commission, and three
non-voting members from state and federal agencies. The basic task initially
delegated to the MTC was the development, within three years, of a regional
transportation plan. The plan was to include highways, transbay bridges and
mass transit systems and was mandated to "pay particular attention to the
interfacing of the various modes of transportation." It was to consider previous
-planning efforts by the Bay Area Transportation S!tudy Committee and other region-
al and subregional planning organizations, as well as the "ecological, economic
and social impact of existing and future regional transportation systems upon
various facets of the region." Finally, the plan was to include a 10 year
estimate of regional transportation needs, a schedule of priorities for
constructing and maintaining the regional transportation system and a financial
plan for that system. Specifically, MTC was mandated to develop the financial
plan "without regard to any constraints imposed by law on expenditures . . .
and, if necessary, recommend appropriate legislation to secure . . . financing."
Once the regional transportation plan was adopted, the Commission
had to (1) revise the plan periodically, (2) approve the construction of any
transbay bridge (or expansion of existing bridges) except for projects already
well underway, (3) approve the construction of any public multicounty transit
system within the region, (4) develop priorities for highway development to
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which the California Highway Commission had to conform except in cases of
overriding statewide significance and (5) review all local applications for
state or federal funds which have transport elements and approve and forward
only those applications which are compatible with the plan. In addition, the
Commission was directed to study the roles of harbors and airports within the
region as they relate to surface taansportation and to "render all available
assistance to transit systems operated within the region by any city or public
agency to ensure adequate feeder service to public multicounty transit systems."
Thus, MTC was developed by the legislature to adopt a regional
transportation plan and program of improvements and was then given the power
to regulate the implementation of that plan. The Legislature suggested that
MTC was to be supported by federal, state and local sources, but that actual
.funding (or sharing of staff) would have to be worked out between MTC and the
various agencies. Clearly, the process of creating a new agency, seeking funds
for that agency and establishing a role for that agency in its political context
can shape how the agency goes about filling its legislatively mandated role.
Given this brief overview of the mandated role for MTC, the following section
describes how this role appears to have evolved as the agency has developed.
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C. The Evolving Role
MTC's role has been shaped by two sets of activities. First, its
mandate to create a regional transportation plan and develop continuing
regional planning played an important role in shaping its early activities.
Second, a number of issues which MTC could not fully resolve until it had its
plan, but which demanded immediate action, forced MTC to develop mechanisms
to deal with these issues in the short run.
As a result of the need to develop a regional plan in the context of
pressing decision, MTC viewed the plan as "the first milestone in the beginning
of a continuing regional transportation planning process that will provide the
commission with a framework for making decisions about transportation for the
entire Bay Area in the years ahead." 4 The Commission identified four major
areas of policy concern which should guide their ictions: (1) the land use -
transportation relationship, (2) local vs regional concerns - establishing
criteria for identifying particular facilities or issues of regional signifi-
cance, (3) environmental impacts and (4) resource allocation and institutional
contraints - identifying a framework for better coordination of existing
agencies. All of these concerns were seen both as elements of a regional
transportation plan and planning process, and as a basis for assessing ongoing
regional actions on priorities for development, the approval of particular
projects and the coordination of the various agencies in the region.
In developing its planning activities, MTC took over and continued
(as directed in the state legislation) the transportation planning activities
of the Bay Area Transportation Study Committee (BATSC) and its successor, the
Regional Transportation Planning Committee. This work involved large scale
regional transportation modelling (in conjunction with ABAG's land use modelling)
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and development and maintenance of a regional data base. MTC initiated, as well,
a large scale, federally funded study of the impact of the BART system in the
Bay Area. Essentially, the tasks involved continuation of many of those which
had been carried out in regional transportation studies across the country.
They were intended to serve as the basis for the development of the MTC plan.
As the same time, however, four major activities more directly tied
to pressing implementation issues (rather than long range planning) emerged in
MTC's first years as important portions of its work program.5 First, one of
the initial justifications for establishing MTC, the satisfaction of federal
planning requirements for transportation planning, became paramount. The
Federal Highway Administration had categorized the Bay Area as not yet having
continuing regional planning and decision-making. More importantly, the Urban
Mass Transportation Administration UMTA) was not. in 1971, considering the Bay
Area eligible for its newly enacted funding programs which provided 2/3 federal
funding of transit projects. Without continuing transportation planning,
decision-making and agency coordination, UMTA only allowed 50 per cent funding
of Bay Area projects and was threatening to cut off all projects. For BART
and MUNI, who sought to add new equipment to their systems, these restrictions
were damaging. Thus MTC, while interested in long range planning efforts,
also held a major interest in the rapid adoption of a plan so that it could
establish its decision-making power to satisfy these federal requirements.
A second activity in which MTC became involved, in part as a response
to these federal requirements, was the establishment of a formal Transit
Coordinating Council with members from all of the major transit operators in
the region. The development of this council was also spurred by the ongoing
difficulties of coordinating BART and AC transit in the East Bay area. Joseph
118
Bort, Chairperson of MTC and a supervisor from Alameda County, called the
council "a demonstration (to federal officials) of the coordination and
planning among transportation authorities in the Bay Area." 6 However, MTC's
role in spurring coordination through this mechanism was limited (1) by its
lack, initially, of funds with which to support coordination and planning
activities for such a council and (2) its lack, in early 1971 when the
Council was created, of a plan with which to guide decisions on regional
transit issues. Nonetheless, MTC's establishment of the Council placed them
in the role of overseeing a forum in which conflicts between agencies could
be discussed and resolved.
A third activity in which MTC quickly became involved was the initia-
tion of or participation in a wi'de range of specific transit improvement
.studies. The transit agencies and many local governments had identified
transit improvements they wanted studied or issues they wanted resolved.
MTC joined with these agencies and sought federal and state funding for these
studies. The studies included airport access, extension of rapid transit to
different areas, improved coordination of services between different operators,
assessment of bus service in local communities and for groups with special
transportation needs and a survey of recreational transit needs. Eleven such
projects were initiated in 1971, ten more were added in 1972. The studies
were guided jointly by MTC, other agencies and local governments and while MTC
added some staff specifically funded to perform these studies, most of the
staff either came from other transit agencies or from consultants. In most
cases, MTC was to provide regional transit travel projections, at first derived
from BATSC projections but later to be provided by a special project to develop
new modelling capabilities for transportation. By beginning to fill long
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neglected gaps in transit planning at both the local and regional level, MTC
was becoming heavily involved in the ongoing planning for particular transit
projects and issues.
A final activity, which emerged from an act of the state legislature,
forced MTC to develop a basis for decision-making on the allocation of transit
funds. The State Transportation Development Act of 1971 (SB325) established
local transportation funds in each county (funded from the sales tax) to be
used primarily for "(a) the support of public transportation systems" and
"(b) aid to public transportation research and demonstration projects.
Under the law, all transit operators within a county make claims for a share
of the money in the county fund. While the total money in each county is fixed,
the local transportation committes, regional council of governments or
statutorily created regional transportation planning agency is to decide on the
allocation of funds among operators and approve the proposed uses of the money.
In MTC's case, where BART, AC, MUNI and Golden Gate Transit overlap, the act
specifically states:
"The commission shall approve those claims which will not
result in the undesirable duplication of public transpor-
tation services, and which will provide for a coordinated
public transportation system in the region."
"The commission may, on its own motion, arbitrate
differences (1) between the various applicants, (2)
between an applicant and a city or county regarding
the costs of the extension of services, and (3)
between the various entities within the region
regarding priorities and the order that various8
improvements are to be made." (emphasis added).
For the Bay Area, the annual SB325 funds range between 35 and 40
million dollars. To administer these, MTC established a small staff (4 new
people) to review claims and to work with a 3 member grant review subcommittee
of the Commission in approving claims. As the dispute between MUNI and BART
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over these funds indicates, MTC was now being asked to help resolve major
and immediate issues prior to the development of its regional plan.
Thus, while MTC was involved in large scale planning activities
and had intentions to use these capabilities in the development and evaluation
of its regional plan, it was being asked to engage in the resolution of several
pressing issues before its plan deVeloped and in one case to make decisions
on those issues. As a result, the concerns to be addressed in the development
of the plan were oriented toward providing a framework for immediate decisions,
rather than to make all the decisions about the future (i.e., a rigid master
plan).
As the political analysis of MTC's plan in Chapter III suggested,
the plan (adopted June 27, 19739) provided only a very vague guide to transpor-
-tation development in the region. This resulted from deference to the many
existing transport agencies to not set rigid priorities (and thereby eliminate
future actions by some of the agencies) as well as from the pragmatic
orientation of the Commission's top leaders who recognized the uselessness of
developing a rigid plan when many issues concerning particular elements of
the plan could not be resolved prior to actual implementation. Essentially,
the plan did little more than identify the issues which were likely to emerge
and, by fulfilling a legislative requirement, provide MTC with its mandated
decision powers to resolve these issues.
With its plan, MTC could now make decisions on key regional transpor-
tation issues as they arose. How it would resolve each issue had for the
most part been left open, and one key question which now faced MTC was how to
organize its planning staff to provide analysis of these issues to help
guide Commission decisions.
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D. Conclusion: Pragmatism and Theory
MTC's regional transportation plan represents a politically pragmatic
approach to planning for transportation development in the Bay Area. MTC's
roles, shaped by the development and adoption of this plan, are (1) to make
difficult regional decisions on the allocation of resources between existing
agencies and between different portions of the region and (2) to foster
coordination of transportation service provided by different agencies. The
plan included general support for guiding regional transportation development
toward improvements in transit service, but the task of establishing the
process and the criteria for making difficult decisions has been left to the
Commission (with its representative structure drawn from local city and county
governments) and to the Commission's executive director and planning staff.
In several respects, the theoretical role concept for the planner
developed in Chapter II should be useful in helping the Commission and its
staff develop a framework in which to make these decisions. First, the planning
staff clearly has an opportunity to provide guidance to political decisions
as they emerge. The staff is directly responsible to the Commission and the -
number of major decisions which must be made by the Commission will necessitate
that the staff help the Commission to review and make these decisions.
Second, the staff has no direct ties to other agencies in the region, placing
them in a position where they can develop information which is not automatically
viewed as biased toward one group or another. While some members of the staff
may hold strong personal views on particular issues, it is not likely that the
top members of the staff, who must be sensitive to the interests of a diverse
set of groups to maintain their credibility and who also decide what work is
performed and reports are prepared by the rest of the staff, would allow work
122
which reflects these personal biases to be developed. Finally, the mandate
by the legislature (and from state and federal requirements) for MTC to be
comprehensive in its planning approach should encourage the staff to consider
a broad range of social, economic and environmental effects of proposed
actions. In addition, the sensitivity of MTC's representatives to different
portions of the region should encourage the development and consideration of
information which identifies the differential effects of proposed actions on
these different portions of the region.
Of course, any attempt to pragmatically apply this theoretical
concept to organizing the MTC staff will be constrained by activities which
MTC is already required to carry out due to historical precedent or federal
and state regulations and by limitations on the staff and resources which MTC
has available to it. Application of this concept, therefore, will require
careful consideration, within these constraints, of what planning activities
MTC seeks to perform and what type of organizational structure MTC should
develop to assign people to carry out these activites.
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CHAPTER V
THE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION:
DEVELOPING AN ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY
A. Introduction: Organizing for Planning
Developing an organizational structure for an agency is a difficult task
which requires a knowledge of the role the agency is intended to play, the
types of activities necessary to fill that role, the resources available for
hiring staff and the diverse personalities of that staff. For MTC, this struc-
ture must be capable of identifying transportation issues as they emerge, recog-
nizing their relationship to other possible issues, setting priorities for re-
view of particular issues, developing comprehensive reviews and summarizing
those reviews in a way which is clear to the community and the MTC decision-
makers. In essence, this does not require only a structure portrayed in an
organizational chart, but also a conscious organizational strategy to identify
what activities must be carried out and with what priority.
This chapter analyzes MTC's current organizational strategy. First, based
on the political analysis of Chapter III and the discussion of MTC's evolving
role in Chapter IV, a series of planning activities which should be performed
by the MTC planning staff to complement the ongoing political decision process
is identified. Second, the current set of planning activities performed by MTC
are assessed in light of this 'ideal' set of planning activities. Finally,
within the financial and technical constraints under which MTC operates, an
alternative organizational strategy is suggested which attempts to coordinate
planning activities to respond better to the ongoing set of issues and decisions
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which come before MTC. This approach will be limited by not being fully aware
of the personalities of the staff which the MTC director can use to develop an
organization. Nonetheless, it will begin to identify potential shifts in the
agency's current organizational strategy to provide more timely and relevant
information to guide political decision-making.
4
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B. Planning Activities to Complement Regional Decision-Making
In Chapter IV it was suggested that the theoretical role concept for the
planner to complement the ongoing political decision process by serving as a
type of overseer to that process was well suited to MTC's political context
and the role MTC has sought to play in that context. In applying this role to
developing a strategy for organizing and coordinating transportation planning
activities within MTC, a number of planning activities necessary to support
the role can be identified. These include some activities which have been re-
quired by federal or state agencies over the past fifteen years as well as
several activities which can aid the planner in linking his or her knowledge
to the political decision-making process. The full set of these activities
is described below.
Required Activities - Federal and state requirements for regional planning
activities have expanded greatly over the past fifteen years. Beginning with
efforts in the early 1960's by the Federal Housing and Home Finance Agency and
the Federal Highway Administration to develop a cooperative, continuing and
comprehensive land use and transportation planning process (the '3-C process '),
these requirements have now been continually updated and expanded to reflect
experience with the 3-C process and newly emerging issues. In the Bay Area,
these requirements have continued to play a role, particularly in stimulating
the development of the Metropolitan Transportation Conission. Now, continuing
requirements at both federal and state levels, as well as the analysis needs of
the various issues emerging in the region, are shaping what planning activities
have to be accomplished by MTC and other regional agencies. These activities
are of four major types:
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1. Transportation and Land Use Modelling - Continuing efforts are re-
quired to update and revise methodologies developed during the 1960's for pre-
dicting regional transportation flows and land use. In the Bay Area, this is
a particularly sensitive issue as many of the early efforts of BATSC, it was
thought, did not provide adequate modelling of transit travel behavior, there-
by biasing any analysis of alternative regional transportation plans. It also
has become important to seek better behavioral models to attempt to understand
the effects on travel behavior of transportation controls such as those pro-
posed by the Environmental Protection Agency. Perhaps most importantly, the
analysis of specific issues (e.g., the extension of BART) which are to be de-
cided by MTC requires some analytic base to begin to understand regional and
subregional travel patterns and how a particular proposal will affect those
patterns (as well as to provide patronage projections, etc.). The need to
provide timely information to decision-makers, the high cost and cumbersome
nature of many of these existing models and the questionable accuracy obtained
from many of these existing models suggests that less expensive, easier to use
methodologies with less sophistication should be developed.
2. Social, Economic and Ecological Assessment - Both the federal govern-
ment and the State of California now require environmental impact statements
for transportation projects (in California they are also required for plans).
The protested environmental impacts of particular transportation facilities
(especially highways) in the Bay Area have been one major reason for the
development of MTC to plan for transportation. MTC did not, however, develop
a formal environmental impact statement for its plan and is now in the process
of developing such a statement.
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Capabilities for assessing environmental impacts require understandings
of the existing social, economic and ecological situation and predictive tools
for analyzing the various impacts of plans and facilities. These types of
capabilities for air pollution impacts are required for the implementation of
Route 1-580 in the Bay Area. The nature of the political context of MTC and
the loose plan the agency developed suggests that environmental issues are most
often raised over particular projects (this was not totally the case for air
quality), and that any regional capability will have to provide a framework
for assessing the project related issues which are likely to arise in the con-
tinuing decisions of MTC.
3. Fiscal Analysis and Planning - Transportation development and planning
is funded from a variety of sources with differing restrictions on how funds
can be used. Federal requirements for improved fiscal planning in the Bay Area
include the Unified Work Program to coordinate the funding of all planning funds
in the region and UMTA's recent requirement that a ten year schedule of priori-
ties and financial plan be developed before the region could get 2/3 federal
funding for transit. These have spurred efforts to improve financial planning.
While funding sources are currently restricted so that certain funds (such
as the Highway Trust fund) cannot be used for other than specific highway devel-
opment and planning, (1) recent changes have reduced these restrictions, there-
by forcing consideration of overall allocation of resources between modes and
(2) even within modes, there are considerations of tradeoffs between different
types of service (e.g. local vs. regional transit service). If an agency is to
resolve issues as they arise in a comprehensive fashion, the fiscal implications
of a particular commitment of resources (i.e. the other actions which will not
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be undertaken because of a lack of funds) must be understood. To accomplish
this requires a realistic and a thorough understanding of the funding sources
and constraints in the Bay Area and the relative financial costs and interde-
pendencies of transportation proposals.
4. Conmunity Participation - The increasing number of controversies over
highway development and urban renewal in the Bay Area and elsewhere during the
1960's spurred increasing federal and state requirements for citizen partici-
pation in transportation and other types of planning. MTC held 15 'town meet-
ings' throughout the Bay Area to discuss issues in the development of its plan
and 4 formal public hearings near the end of the development of its plan. This
was done in recognition of the importance of participation by all groups, not
just local elected officials, if All important issues involved in deciding upon
and implementing a transportation proposal are going to be identified and re-
solved at the earliest possible point.
If ongoing decisions are going to be guided by participation, planners for
MTC will require skills at explaining complex issues to diverse community groups
and communicating with those groups (verbally, in writing and graphically) about
their particular interests and concerns. Otherwise, the political process may
neglect certain concerns in deciding to implement a proposal, only to have them
surface later as major issues which might block implementation.
Other Planning Activities - In addition to the activities required by state
and federal agencies which can help guide decision-making on transportation
issues, several others should be performed. These include:
1. Transit and Highway Implementation Planning - MTC, in the evolution of
its role, has identified and begun to fill gaps in regional and local transit
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planning activities. Highway planning, while better coordinated under the
local district of the California Department of Transportation, will hopefully
further be improved through the newly developed Traffic Management Council.
While much of current detailed highway and transit planning is being per-
formed by existing agencies, MTC should have a stake in developing implemen-
tation planning capabilities for seVeral reasons: (1) MTC can play a "neutral"
role in providing staff work to either the Metropolitan Transit Federation or
the Traffic Management Council (they are mandated to play this role for deci-
sions on SB325 allocations) - to accomplish this requires capabilities for
understanding analyses of issues performed by existing agencies, combining these
analyses to provide a common basis for coordination and perhaps performing the
analysis itself; (2) control of implementation planning activities by operating
agencies limits the planning work done and the proposals under consideration to
only those projects in which the agency is interested - both transit and high-
way implementation of major projects require substantial lead times for imple-
mentation, and by studying only those projects of interest to each particular
agency, the types of proposals that can be considered at any one time by MTC
are decided upon by each agency, not by MTC, suggesting that MTC should begin
to understand how the 'pipelines' in different agencies work, what the lead
times for different projects are and perhaps to begin to perform studies where
currently there are none underway (such as the Transit Improvement Studies);
(3) environmental issues related to the overall acceptability of particular
projects often do not arise until detailed planning begins - to ensure that
MTC maintains the flexibility to reverse earlier decisions on implementation
should this occur, it will be necessary to monitor ongoing planning activities
and ensure that all major issues are identified and resolved before the agency
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is committed to one final plan for implementation and (4) highway and transit
implementation planning may often have to be closely coordinated - while BART
and the local district of the State Department of Transportation have developed
several coordinated projects, MTC can play a role in identifying where further
coordination is necessary and overseeing that coordination.
In transit planning, these roles for the MTC planning staff require know-
ledge of facility design, environmental impacts, fare and revenue structures,
route planning, identification of service needs, etc. For highway planning
the needs are similar with emphasis on operations planning (e.g. ramp metering,
carpool lanes) as well as on facility development. The transit improvement
studies undertaken by M1TC provide a start in this direction, although these are
not always performed with in-house capabilities. In addition, the requirement
for MTC's development of a Unified Work Program for regional transportation
planning activities should provide impetus to coordinate what planning on what
projects is being done in the region.
2. Community Technical Assistance - While the transportation agencies and
local governments in the Bay Area are represented on ITC or its coordinating
councils and have available to them resources for planning and policy analysis,
citizen interest groups in the region do not always have such expertise avail-
able. Among these citizen groups, some, such as the Sierra Club, the League of
Women Voters and the businessmen's Bay Area Council, do have staff available,
while others, such as poor and minority groups from Oakland, San Jose and San
Francisco, do not. In the Boston Transportation Planning Review, funds were
set aside and administered separately from the ongoing studies to provide tech-
nical assistance to such groups to ensure that (1) they understood the impacts
on them of particular decisions and (2) their interests were expressed and
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considered in decisions. 2 In MTC, where the political analysis above identi-
fies a certain bias in the current representation structure, this assistance
may be crucial to ensuring comprehensive decisions. However, the mechanism for
establishing a community technical assistance group which can use the planning
and data resources of MTC but which openly encourages opposition to particular
actions may be politically difficult'to develop.
3. Issue Evaluation and Summarization - A critical portion of a staff role
for the MTC planning staff is that of "creating the linkage" necessary for tech-
nical knowledge to be understood and considered in decisions by the commission.
This requires an ability to evaluate issues from the perspective of all of the
different interest groups involved and to summarize these issues quickly (i.e.
when decisions arise), concisely (so as to make them understandable, but brief)
and in a way which suits the working style of the different members of the
commission (e.g. short report, graphics, verbal presentations). The reporting
of planning findings is not just an added piece of paperwork at the end of
sophisticated planning work, but the critical process by which planning infor-
mation can be linked to decision-making. As a result, it may be valuable to
make such activities a conscious portion of an agency work program, with certain
individuals, with talents in writing and graphic display and an understanding
of the working style of the different members of the decision making body,
specifically assigned to these activities.
To perform all of these activities to their fullest extent would require
nearly unlimited resources of time and personnel. In the Bay Area political
context, however, it would seem that the MTC director should be seeking to in-
clude at least the essential components of all of these activities in the
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agency's work program. To accomplish this on an ongoing basis requires an or-
ganizational strategy which includes: (1) an organizational structure which
coordinates these various elements to provide concise, comprehensive informa-
tion to the decision-makers as issues arise and (2) a strategy on the part of
the director to prioritize how much effort should go into each of these activi-
ties and which particular transportation issues should be being considered at
any one time.
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C. The Current Strategy
In the MTC legislation, the Commission was designated to appoint an Execu-
tive Director, who was in turn to appoint all necessary employees. In the
early years of the Commission, the Director and Deputy Director were primarily
involved in establishing a basic role for the agency in the region, acquiring
funds to support the agency and overseeing the necessary work to prepare a
regional plan. As the agency's funds have increased (from increased state and
federal aid) and the regional transportation plan has been adopted, the agency's
staff has grown tremendously. In its early days, informal working relationships
between the 20 to 40 staff members could be maintained and the agency's various
tasks could be performed. But as the staff has increased (75 in January 1974,
planned to reach 100), as the number of outside consulting contracts which MTC
is overseeing has grown in many diverse directions, and as the demands for for-
mal and careful review of issues coming before the Commission have multiplied,
MTC has been forced to develop a more formal organizational structure. This
structure (as illustrated in Figure V.1) is not so totally formal as this neat
chart might suggest. However, it does represent a conscious assignment of re-
sponsibility to different parts of the organization and decisions on which
activities the organization should be performing. 3
Activities - The current organization is overseen by the MTC Executive
Director and Deputy Executive Director. These people play the major role in
liason between the planning staff and the Commission, identifying planning
which needs to be done, priorities for work items and overseeing preparation
of presentations to the Commission. The executive office is aided in this by a
work program management group with three people and by a secretariat with four
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FIGURE V.I CURRENT MTC ORGANIZATION
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people responsible for coordination with the Commission and specification of
the reports the Commission has requested from the staff.
Below this executive level, five divisions have been established. The one
with the most funding, the group studying BART's impacts on the Bay Area, is
only indirectly controlled by MTC and is largely concerned with monitoring in-
depth consulting studies which are not directly tied to the remainder of the
MTC work program.4 A second division, with twelve people, is concerned with
providing services to the remainder of the agency and overseeing minor special
projects. This division has responsibility for personnel, public relations and
graphics. A third division, resource management, administers the various re-
sources and review powers which MTC has directly at its disposal. These in-
clude administration of claim review for the local Transportation Development
Funds (SB325), project review for Commission approval of all state and Federal
(A-95) grants and other transportation projects, and agency budgeting, account-
ing, contract administration and other fiscal responsibilities. The division
has considerable contact with the various agencies and local governments sub-
mitting claims and projects for review. It is staffed by eleven people.
Planning activities in MTC are primarily carried out by the fourth and
fifth divisions. The first of these is concerned with implementation planning,
overseeing the numerous transit and highway improvement studies under MTC's
aegis, identifying necessary revisions to the regional transportation plan
(based on changing funding, community acceptability, etc.), preparing revisions
for Commission consideration and developing and updating the ten year capital
improvements program for the region. Their duties also include development of
potential alternative regional transportation plans for evaluation by MTC and
ABAG. The division has extensive contacts with various operating agencies and
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local governments with which MTC is jointly participating in the development
studies. The activities are carried on by sixteen people.
Finally, the transportation planning and analysis division, with nineteen
people, is responsible for comprehensive planning activities, including land
use and transportation modelling with ABAG (carrying on the work of BATSC),
testing of alternative transportation plans (should they be developed), over-
seeing the development of an environmental impact assessment procedure (by a
consultant) and applying this environmental procedure to the analysis of alter-
native transportation plans as well as to the environmental assessment of par-
ticular projects. The division is also responsible for management of regional
data sources and attempts to coordinate this work with other regional and sub-
regional agencies to provide data for their planning needs and to develop a
common regional data base.
Interactions - As was briefly suggested above, these formal divisions
of MTC do not fully reflect the working patterns of the agency. To carry out
its various duties, a number of interactions between groups within the agency
and with various external actors are undertaken. The integration of the plann-
ing work in the agency is overseen by the Deputy Executive Director with the
aid of the work program management group. If requests for information are
made by the Commission, the secretariat develops the specifications for reports
which should be prepared (i.e., what information, how lengthy), and the Deputy
identifies people responsible for producing that information and oversees its
development. When proposals are submitted for review, specific groups receive
that proposal (e.g., proposals for studies or inclusion in the ten year capital
improvement program go to implementation planning; project and SB325 claim
reviews go to resource management). Each of these, in consultation with the
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Deputy Director, set priorities for which issues receive priority and what
level of analysis should be done.
The proposals are then circulated to other appropriate divisions for review
of particular portions of the proposal. For example, project reviews are
made with the coordination of the implementation planning group, which conments
on the place of the proposal in the .current capital improvements program and
identifies other project dependencies, and the planning and analysis group
which assesses, if possible, the transportation impacts of the proposal and
reviews the proposal's environmental impact statement. With its recently de-
veloped environmental procedures (which include sensitivity mapping), the plann-
ing and analysis group may also apply simple conceptual models (or perhaps a
soon to be developed detailed air'quality model) to predicting environmental
impacts. With these inputs, the resource management division then develops a
summary review of a proposal for presentation to the Commission. In this way,
the staff pulls together relevant inputs from each of the divisions to develop
comprehensive reviews.
A second set of interactions involves the staff and the Commission. Pri-
mary contact is developed through the Executive Director, who oversees what
activities are carried out by the agency and presents the agency's budget to
the Commission for approval. In addition, several committees of the Commission
work closely with portions of the organization. The finance committee is pri-
marily concerned with overseeing the agency's budget (prepared by the resource
management division for the Director). The work program committee works with
the deputy executive director and the work program management group to develop
priorities for the agency's work program, oversee the carrying out of that work
program and report to the overall Commission on proposed revisions to the pro-
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gram (as well as reviewing submitted revisions to the plan). This committee
plays a key role in providing political guidance to the technical processes.
Finally, the grant review committee coordinates with the resource management
division on the review of specific proposals (and priorities for reviewing
those proposals) and on the review and arbitration of claims for SB325 Funds.
This committee recommends approval or disapproval of actions to the broader
Commission.
While these three committees can all play key roles in guiding MTC activi-
ties, they are limited in these roles by the fact that the commissioners are
part time and unpaid, and often have many local issues in their own jurisdic-
tions to resolve. Nevertheless, certain members of the Commission (most notably
Joseph Bort, its first chairperson) have taken active roles in guiding what
activities are carried out and which issues are given in-depth attention by the
staff.
The third set of interactions involves the staff, other agencies and the
public. MTC's strong powers over the actions of other regional and subregional
agencies have brought about intensive interaction between MTC and these agencies.
While much of the interaction is at a high political level (i.e., through Com-
mission members to the Executive Director), MTC's staff also maintains important
ties to these agencies. Project review personnel normally assess the informa-
tion developed by the proposing agency and reviews criticisms with those agen-
cies (although at the end of their proposal development process). Review of
claims for SB325 Funds are carried out by 3 or 4 junior staff at MTC (overseen
by senior staff) who play liaison roles with particular agencies. Transit and
highway development studies are overseen by the implementation planning division
and members of that division have regular contact with representatives from the
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other agencies which are involved in the studies (e.g., the different members
of the Transit Coordinating Council). In addition, capital improvements pro-
gramming has involved extensive review of the programs of different agencies.
This has focussed primarily on transit program development (where there was a
lack of centralized planning) and is only now beginning to include coordination
with the highway program development staff of the local district of the Cali-
fornia Department of Transportation. Finally, agency contact has been carried
out on a primarily technical basis between the transportation planning and analy-
sis division and other agency planning groups. This has~included coordination
of data bases, or air quality prediction capabilities, and, in the case of the
local districts of the California Department of Transportation, sharing of staff
in network travel modelling and eivironmental analysis.
Public involvement has also taken several forms. Major regional interest
groups, state legislators and other public officials communicate directly with
the executive office or with members of the Commission. In addition, the agency
has developed a sizable public information program with a regional mailing list
and a well-maintained community letter file to record opinions and ideas. Fin-
ally, members of the staff from various divisions have attended a number of re-
gional and local public meetings and hearings concerned with transportation to
identify issues and gather reactions on specific proposals and on the regional
transportation plan. The number of staff in attendance, their area of planning
specialty and their rank within the organization varies with the size of the
meeting, its subject matter and the type of presentation (if any) MTC is ex-
pected to make.
An Assessment - MTC has, of necessity, developed a flexible planning organ-
ization to develop information to guide Comnission decisions. Specific duties
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of the Commission (e.g., project review) are assigned to particular portions
of the staff, who then call upon the rest of the staff to provide elements of
the overall analysis of an issue. During the year, as issues are analyzed and
decisions are reached, needs for revision of the plan are identified and re-
commended to the Commission. This process is managed by the Deputy Executive
Director and the Commission's work program committee, who serve to prioritize
issues and identify what work needs to be done. Throughout the agency, numerous
contacts are maintained with other agencies and the public, and these provide
some direction for the activities of the agency.
As is apparent from this review, many of the planning activities described
above as necessary to complement political decision making are to some extent
being performed by MTC. Land use, transportation and environmental analysis,
financial planning (at least for transit) and community participation have all
been given attention. A significant portion of MTC's resources and personnel
are involved in implementation planning for highways and transit, although
sometimes only as overseers of work by other agencies or consultants. But in
terms of the political context in which MTC is operating (i.e., diverse interest
groups with unequal access to decision-making; issues continuously emerging
from these interest groups), and the role MTC has established for itself (pri-
marily as a forum for resolving issues as they arise), the current organizational
strategy of MTC is lacking in several areas. Specifically:
1. The process to set work priorities and coordinate work may not be able
to identify all issues which are likely to emerge and is hindered by separations
within the agency.
The prime priority setting group is made up of the Executive Director, the
Deputy, the Commission's work program committee and the small work program
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management group. Informally, the heads of the three primary planning divi-
sions (resource management, implementation planning, and planning and analysis)
are also involved. However, issues are raised in many forms and by many
groups which have contacts with different parts of the MTC staff. Agencies
submit projects for review and claims for funds to groups at lower levels of
MTC and various interest groups express environmental and other concerns to
the actual proposal reviewers. Under its current priority setting mechanism,
MTC primarily uses inputs from the Commission (and through them from high level
heads of agencies) which do not always represent the full set of issues which
are likely to emerge (or which are not always sensitive to broader community
concerns). One result of such limited priority setting is that lower level
staff may sometimes expend a large amount of time developing detailed analyses,
only to find that the Commission (1) can only read the briefest of documents
and (2) are not aware of the need to consider the full range of issues the
planning staff has addressed. Detailed project reviews may then be ignored
by the Commission, or may never be seen by them, frustrating agency staff, and
wasting valuable resources. Also, Commission actions might be taken without
considering certain issues which will nevertheless emerge at a later pbint'to
block implementation. A more responsive priority setting forum might improve
this aspect of the priority setting process.
In addition, the separation of the different divisions within MTC can hin-
der integration of work activities which would increase the agency's effective-
ness. For example, project reviews regularly come at the end of an agency's
proposed development process, making agencies unwilling to change project de-
tails in response to an MTC critique. However, MTC, in its implementation and
financial planning activities, plays some part in developing these projects.
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Currently, however, no formal mechanism exists to identify, during the work
priority setting process, projects which are currently under development,
which are likely to require Commission review and which could benefit from
the early involvement of the project review staff for environmental and other
aspects of evaluation.
Finally, while both high level and staff level liaison is necessary to
maintain effective regional planning efforts, MTC currently has a wide range
of such liaison which can hinder the coordination of MTC relationships with
particular agencies (and confuse priority setting for MTC work). For example,
MTC can take four types of actions on proposals to either approve or dis-
approve them. It can (1) approve the use of implementation study funds for
particular studies (e.g., extenstion of BART), (2) include funds for implemen-
tation in the capital improvements program (e.g., acquisition of new rolling
stock), (3) review a particular project (e.g., a BART station development) for
environmental and other considerations and approval of the Commission or (4)
approve a claim for SB325 Funds submitted by an agency (e.g. , funding of BART's
deficit). All four types of proposals may be made by a single agency at any
one time, yet the first two actions are overseen by MTC's implementation
planning division and the last two by its resource management division, with
different committees of the Commission involved. Thus, it can be difficult
to coordinate the various actions MTC may take and to set priorities for work
to be done on analyzing each action.
2. Large scale planning activities continue as they were under BATSC,
without adequate direction from tihe Commission on developing planning tools
which are useful to guide ongoing decisions in the broad framework outlined
in the regional plan.
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A large portion of the joint ABAG-MTC land use and transportation plann-
ing program (40%) is devoted to the development of plan alternatives and the
testing of these and the current MTC regional transportation plan for trans-
portation and land use effects. In that the MTC implementation planning group
has been given prime responsibility for developing alternatives, alternatives
are likely to reflect some realistic constraints on resources. However, the
MTC plan does not currently represent a commitment to an entire transportation
system. As a result, alternatives developed for evaluation (1) would have to-
reflect the uncertainties of future implementation of most of the projects in
the MTC plan and (2) would have to provide information, as issues arise, on
what the long term implications (i.e., options open and foreclosed; impacts)
of making near term decisions and commitments of resources are. The expensive
and cumbersome methodology which BATSC (and now MTC-ABAG) have developed has
not proved useful in providing timely information to Bay Area transportation
decisions (witness the current delay of one year in all transit extension
studies due to problems with the models). It may be necessary, therefore, to
develop more flexible and less expensive tools to quickly predict transporta-
tion flows (much like the simple conceptual models being developed for MTC by
its environmental consultant). It may also be useful to develop a formal
mechanism, sensitive to the interests of the Commission, which identifies what
types of alternative plans are investigated and what priority is placed on
different plans.
3. Review and approval of SB325 is not closely tied to financial and
implementation planning activities.
Review and approval of the claims of different transit operators in the
region for SB325 funds is one of the key leverage points which MTC holds over
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the shape of transit agency financial plans (and management). In its role as
arbitrator between BART and MUNI or BART and AC, MTC can shape what kind of
long range plans the agencies can have, what types of management capabilities
it has (by disapproving funding of subsidies without improvements in manage-
ment) and how much the agencies are willing to cooperate with MTC. Many of
these considerations are directly related to the financial planning activi-
ties of identifying needs for transit service and opportunities for fare and
route coordination, as well as developing ten year capital improvement pro-
grams and financial plans. But SB325 review is under a different division
from financial and implementation planning and has a small separate staff
which develops its own liaison with the transit agencies and isolated reviews
of claims. Thus far the most significant issue which the review process has
brought to the attention of the transit agencies has been to pressure them to
participate actively and cooperate with the Transit Coordinating Council (now
the Metropolitan Transit Federation). In the BART-MUNI dispute over funds
it remained for the two agencies to work out the financial details of the com-
promise resolution, with MTC providing political pressure for compromise, but
without detailed financial analysis by MTC staff. Better coordination of
these activities might have provided MTC with the knowledge to play an active
mediating role, providing relatively neutral information as a basis for under-
standing the positive and negative effects of different potential resolutions
of the dispute.
4. MTC has not carefully structured its organization to produce concise,
understandable analyses of issues for the community and decision-makers.
While the secretariat does prepare specifications for reports to the
Conmission, the actual preparation of the reports is left to the particular
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division assigned the responsibility for the reports. Further, agency services,
which provides graphics, has not played an active role in shaping presentations
to ensure good graphic presentation. Finally, no one group has been assigned
to assess materials produced as to their clarity and conciseness for community
groups (this is done, to some extent, by the executive director for reports to
the Commission). As a result, MTC produced a first progress report on the de-
velopment of the environmental impact report for its plan which was long, in-
complete and hard to comprehend.5 Their unified work program for the region,
outlining proposed planning work for MTC and other regional and local agencies
for the 1973-74 year, while required to have certain components by Federal
regulations, was also long and complex.6 To develop information which can
guide political decision-making;,the MTC planners must develop better prepared,
more easily understandable planning analyses which clearly provide information
to help resolve the key issues being addressed.
5. MTC does not take an active role in encouraging and aiding community
groups to partici-ate in the planning and decision-making process.
MTC currently maintains substantial efforts at gathering community reac-
tions to major issues (such as the development of the plan). However, many
critical issues were not resolved in the adoption of the plan but rather were
left to be resolved as particular issues arise and MTC sets priorities to
study or defer them. Well-organized regional interest groups (i.e., Sierra
Club, League of Women Voters) are likely to maintain ongoing relationships with
the MTC staff which serve to incorporate some of their interests in work
priority setting and decision-making (e.g., both of the groups mentioned above
are likely to submit extensive recommended revisions in this year's cycle of
regional transportation plan revision). But many groups (e.g., La Raza Unida
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[a Mexican-American group], NAACP, etc.) do not have organized efforts to
provide ongoing input to MTC actions, in part because their priorities for
action are elsewhere, but also in part because they have neither the technical
assistance necessary to identify their interests in regional transportation
proposals nor a specifically designated contact person within MTC (i.e., neither
the members of the Commission nor the top level staff are seeking extensive
and continued inputs from these groups (except at times when very specific
issues [e.g., Route 24 in Oakland] arise). MTC (or perhaps some other regional
or subregional agency) may want to remedy this problem.
Several criticisms of the current MTC organizational strategy have been
discussed above. They are aimed at identifying portions of the MTC strategy
which might be altered to improve the effectiveness of the MTC staff in link-
ing their technical knowledge to decisions by the Commission. In a way, de-
veloping an organizational strategy for a planning and decision-making agency
like MTC is itself a sequential learning process, much like the process of
making decisions about the implementation of transportation improvements and
the future of the region. With the knowledge available at any one time, deci-
sions are made about an organizational strategy. Then, as the strategy is
implemented and problems and opportunities arise, changes in the strategy are
decided upon, based on improved knowledge. In a very similar fashion, MTC
has begun to identify some of the problems discussed above and to develop
responses to those problems. For example, the Deputy Director is now trying
to develop a preliminary priority setting process to identify issues which
only require staff approval, issues which also require committee approval and
issues which require the attention of the entire Commission.7 In this way,
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priorities for what types and amounts of work need to be done on each issue
can be set, and limited resources can be used more carefully.
It may be that the limited resources with which MTC is operating and the
personality constraints which must be considered in developing an organization-
al strategy will preclude MTC from ever remedying all of these problems at one
time. Nonetheless, an attempt is made in the following section to propose an
alternative organizational strategy which is more consciously sensitive to
MTC's environment. The alternative is constrained to use the same personnel
resources as the current MTC organizational strategy and its advantages and
disadvantages are compared to those of the current strategy.
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D. An Alternative Strategy
Essentially, the activities currently being carried out by MTC include the
major activities which such an agency would be expected to perform. However,
to develop an organizational strategy which carefully sets priorities for work
which are responsive to diverse interest groups and which provide timely tech-
nical information to guide decisions, it may be necessary to restructure the
way priorities are set and alter the priorities placed on different types of
staff work. In Figure V.2, an alternative strategy for organizing MTC is pre-
sented. The major portions of this revised structure, and the changes in the
activities of each portion, are described below.
The Executive Office - The agency is still run by the Executive Director
and a Deputy, but with slightly different adjunct activities. The secretariat
maintains its duties of coordinating information for the Commission and speci-
fying what information and reports are desired by the Commission. In addition,
personnel in graphics and public affairs are added to the secretariat to fur-
ther advise on the formats and content of reports to be prepared, with an eye
to clarity and conciseness in presentations. The second adjunct to the execu-
tive office becomes the administration section, involved in personnel matters,
budget preparation (primarily summarizing the work of the work program group
for the Commission and Executive Director), budget administration, and agency
services including the library. The Executive Director maintains the position
as key staff decision-maker and liaison to the Commission. The Deputy Execu-
tive Director continues to oversee work program development and priority sett-
ing in conjunction with the Commission's work program committee but also now
with the aid of an internal issue identification and work program development
forum.
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FIGURE V.2 AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY
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Issue identification and work program development - This new group (re-
constituted out of the resource management division) becomes the key forum for
setting work priorities for the agency. The Deputy Executive Director and the
work program committee of the Commission now engage in regular work priority
setting meetings with this group. Also, prime responsibility for identifying
plan revisions to be studied, transit or highway improvement studies to be
initiated, project reviews to be studied or SB325 claims to be analyzed, lies
with this forum.
The group is made up of six people (of a fairly senior level) who serve
as the prime MTC liaisons with community groups and the transit and highway
agencies in the region. It also includes three junior level people as staff.
Among the liaison positions, the ,three people charged with community liaison
would spend half of their time establishing contacts with diverse regional
and local groups, identifying issues related to specific projects or to allo-
cations of funds, and expressing those issues in the work priority setting
forum. The other half of their time would be spent identifying issues on
which MTC is doing planning which require community interaction, developing
strategies for that interaction, identifying teams from all parts of MTC to
be involved in that interaction (with the approval of the broader priority
setting group) and helping those teams prepare their presentations.
Those charged with liaison with highway and transit agencies (as well as
the Metropolitan Transit Federation and the Traffic Management Council) would
be the prime contact persons between MTC and these agencies. Although other
groups (such as implementation planning and financial planning) would also
have contacts with these agencies, these other activities would need to be
coordinated with the key MTC liaison person with that agency. The prime
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duties of these key liaison persons, in addition to this internal coordina-
tion function, would be to identify issues which the agencies see as of top
priority, to express these in the issue analysis and work program forum and,
with the direction of that forum, to work with the agencies to develop SB325
claims which are in conformance with the regional plan. In this last duty,
these personnel might work closely, as well, with the Commission's grant re-
view committee.
The overall work.priority setting forum, with ten senior members (three
Commission members, the deputy executive director and the six liaison person-
nel) and three staff members, would function as follows. At regular inter-
vals (2 weeks or a month) it would meet to identify issues that have been
raised (e.g., requests for project review or study initiation) by agencies,
the community and the Commission. The current work loads of different parts
of MTC would be assessed and priorities would be set for analysis, review or
initiation of studies on particular issues. With the help of their staff
(and the financial planning group), the group would identify potential finan-
cial interdependencies between new and existing issues and implementation
planning work already underway which is related to new issues. Based on this
background, and with the advice of the secretariat on report preparation and
of the community liaison people on necessary community interaction, the group
would specify what financial, implementation and environmental issues need to
be addressed in the analysis, what groups in MTC would be responsible for pre-
paring the information and how reports whould be presented. The three staff
members and the work program management group would then ensure that the work
is assigned to the different planning portions of MTC and one member of the
staff would be given prime responsibility for pulling the work together.
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In addition to these short range, ongoing activities, the issue identifi-
cation and program development group would have several important longer range
responsibilities. First, the annual cycles of SB325 claim reviews would re-
quire that the group, with input from the Commission and the implementation
and financial planning groups, establish policies for the allocation of the
funds and priorities for the types of transit improvements they would like to
see reflected in the claims (e.g., funds to subsidize unified fare structures
or route coordination experiments). These policies and priorities would then
guide the work of the transit liaison personnel as they work with the agencies
to develop their claims. Second, the annual Federal requirement for the devel-
opment of a regional unified work program for Bay Area transportation planning
should be met by this group. Lorger range needs for shifts in the distribu-
tions of planning resources (e.g., from large scale analysis to implementation
planning) can be identified, and issue areas which need increased funding for
analysis (e.g., transit coordination studies, or environmental impacts) can be
assessed. In this way, this diverse group can aid MTC in beginning to sub-
stantively coordinate the planning resources of the entire region.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the annual revision of the region-
al transportation plan and the capital improvement program should be overseen
by this group. The set of issues which arise throughout the year is likely to
serve as a basis for revisions to the plan (e.g., changes in categorization,
changes in what is included in the capital improvement program). The yearly
cycles of plan review and revision provide opportunities for integrating these
various issues and understanding the interrelationships among issues more fully.
To accomplish this, the issue identification and work program development group
might identify, once each year, alternative sets of regional funding assumptions
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(about total monies available, monies available for transit and highways),
alternative sets of improvements and actions to be developed over the next
ten to twenty years within these different funding assumptions (e.g., a pro-
gram of actions (i.e., pricing policies, facility improvements) to improve air
quality, one to improve transit for low income areas, etc.) and transportation,
social, economic and environmental criteria by which to assess these alterna-
tives. By identifying these alternatives in a forum which can be sensitive
to the concerns of the decision-makers, the community and other agencies, the
group can guide the core planning groups within MITC to develop alternatives
in some detail which reflect diverse objectives held by different groups in
the region and to prepare comprehensive evaluations of those alternatives.
By developing the alternatives as realistic, sequential programs of improve-
ment within different funding assumptions, the MTC staff can develop a set of
basic evaluation tools for revising the plan and analyzing particular new
issues as they arise.8
With evaluations of these different alternatives in hand and with a set
of proposed revisions to the regional transportation plan to be reviewed, the
issue identification and work program development group can, with the aid of
the financial planning group, assess which funding assumption appears most
realistic at a given point in time and then identify how the set of proposed
revisions (i.e., revisions to change categories or change funding priorities)
fit into the alternatives which were developed under that particular funding
assumption (e.g., Would approving the proposed revision not be consistent
with providing transit service to low income areas (i.e., by using up limited
funds to build suburban transit extensions] or would approving the proposed
revision encourage rapid growth in highway travel, thereby not being consistent
with an air quality alternative?).
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These sets of alternatives would also be useful throughout the year as a
basis for analysis for particular issues which arise. Each year, this set of
alternatives could be revised to reflect changing knowledge of funding con -
straints, project uncertainties, etc. By overseeing development of these
alternatives, the issue identification and work program development forum can
provide politically sensitive guidance to MTC's planning staff to help them
develop timely answers to the actual questions being asked in the region by
decision-makers, the community and the other agencies. To make effective use
of this guidance, the core planning groups would begin to shift the kind of
activities they are undertaking and the kinds of information they are pre-
paring.
Core Planning - To respond to the more conscious and responsive priority
setting activities of the issue identification and work program development
group, the three basic components of MTC's planning staff (financial planning,
implementation planning, and planning and analysis) must carefully integrate
their respective activities and develop planning capabilities which can res-
pond to issues with timely and appropriate information. The heads of these
three groups might also sit in on meetings of the work priority setting forum,
to provide substantive planning information to that group and to get direction
from that group on what activities they should be performing. Specifically,
the three groups would operate as follows:
-Financial Planning - This group, which would increase in size by taking
some personnel from the planning and analysis group, would be charged with
providing information on potential sources of funds, likely constraints on
the uses of those funds and potential actions (e.g., legislative recommenda-
tions) to increase the funds and the flexibility with which they can be used.
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With the implementation planning group (and the guidance of the issue analy-
sis and work program development forum) they would develop alternative capital
improvement programs under sets of existing, likely and optimistic funding con-
straints. The financial analysis of what kinds of projects and programs can
be included under different funding assumptions and the legislative analysis
of changes necessary to increase funding would be tied to the transportation
and environmental analysis performed by the planning and analysis group. This
should help the Commission revise the capital improvements program of the re-
gional transportation plan, providing information on the total allocation of
funds to different types of transit and highway improvements and the amount of
money which will either have to be raised locally or be obtained from newly
developed sources of funds.
In developing its financial analysis and alternative programs, the group
would have to understand the programming procedures of all other agencies with-
in the region. For example, they would work with these agencies in the joint
development of computerized financial information systems (the local district
of the State Department of Transportation already has one of these for high-
ways) to facilitate the quick development of financial summaries for different
programs of improvements. Their contacts with agency programming staff would
be reported in regular meetings to the key MTC liaison to those agencies, to
deep that person abreast of all of the latest financial information from each
agency.
-Implementation Planning - This group would play a role similar to that
which it has played. At the direction of the issue identification and work
program development forum, this group, in conjunction with other regional
agencies and the other portions of MTC's planning staff, would develop the
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format and work program for studies on particular implementation issues, con-
tract out or perform those studies and report back to the issue identification
and work program development forum on findings. Here again, regular meetings
with the key MTC liaison people with the different agencies might be held (in
conjunction with the financial planning people) to keep the liaison persons
informed of all implementation planning activities of the different agencies.
The MTC implementation planning group would also play a key role, in con-
junction with the financial planning group, in detailing alternative programs
of transportation improvements, by identifying the likely "lead times" neces-
sary for implementation of different projects and the interdependencies of
different projects (e.g., if one major highway is built, two other connecting
links will also be necessary). From its familiarity with implementation
issues in particular portions of the region, this group may also be able to
identify particular social and environmental issues of community concern
which (1) the planning and analysis group should specifically analyze and
(2) which might delay portions of a program or cause redesign, increasing
costs (and therefore decreasing the number of improvements which can be real-
istically included under any one financial constraint). This group essen-
tially plays the role of including specific implementation issues in broader
regional financial allocation and policy decisions.
-Planning and Analysis - This group is charged with providing transporta-
tion, social and environmental analyses of particular project issues and of
alternative programs of improvements. They have been reduced in size to
allow for the expansion of other groups. To compensate for this, they will
need to develop close coordination between themselves, the ABAG staff and the
travel forecasting and environmental staffs of the State Department of Trans-
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portation (they have already begun to do this). In addition, they would,
wherever possible, make use of the products of the BART impact study.
To respond to the many project issues in the short time frame necessary,
and to be able to evaluate many alternative plans, this group would concen-
trate on the development of analysis tools which produce reasonable predic-
tions quickly. The environmental impact assessment procedure which is cur-
rently being developed consists of mapping of important environmental and
social characteristics of the region and the development of rough conceptual
models to predict impacts of particular facilities and to aggregate those
9
impact for programs of improvements. While the development of good, large
scale travel models and more sophisticated impact prediction models will be
necessary (e.g., good travel estimates [sensitive to policy as well as
facility charges] and air quality prediction to satisfy the EPA), the develop-
ment of both sophisticated and simple capabilities should be carried out. 10
In this way, the planning and analysis section can provide rough assessments
of the basic differences between alternative programs of improvements and
also more detailed analyses of Darticular corridor or project issues. How-
ever, careful development of all of these tools may require additional per-
sonnel, suggesting either priority for new personnel (above 75) being assigned
to planning and analysis or shifts within the organizational structure as it
has been described.
These three elements would hopefully form an integrated core planning
group, preparing analyses of issues for the Commission as they arise and
making effective use of their planning resources and those of other agencies.
The groups' activities would not shift radically from those they are currently
performing, but they would be more carefully directed to deliver timely and
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concise information to MTC's decision-makers and the community.
Community Technical Assistance - One other potential activity (which
might not be a direct part of MTC's budget and therefore might not have to
use MTC's personnel as has been assumed here) would be the development of a
small community technical assistance staff (5 people). Using suggestions from
MTC community liaison workers, organized regional and local interest groups
and from a separate board of control made up of local and regional interest
group representatives (e.g., NAACP, La Raza Unida), this group would identify
community groups which had an important stake in a particular issue coming
before the Commission (e.g., a major freeway, a new coordinated fare policy)
and would seek to provide technical assistance to help the groups better under-
stand their interests in a particular issue and to help them express those
interests in the broader decision arena. The group would have access to the
data sources (and perhaps some of the planning expertise) of MTC but would not
be under the direct control of the Commission. While this may be politically
difficult to achieve and five people may not be enough to work effectively
all of the important issues, this group would represent a significant step by
MTC toward ensuring that all affected interest groups have an opportunity to
express their interests on an issue.
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E. A Comparison
It is difficult to assess, without actually implementing this alternative
organizational strategy, how much better this strategy would provide informa-
tion to guide the ongoing decisions of MTC or how well the suggested alloca-
tions of personnel would work. Nonetheless, several general advantages and
disadvantages of the strategy can be identified.
First, the strategy provides for a conscious, high level work priority
setting mechanism within MTC aimed at nroviding timely, decision oriented in-
formation. The Commission is likely to have before it many more issues than
it could ever fully appraise and only limited resources with which to assess
those of highest priority. Currently, an, informal process headed by the
deputy executive director sets priorities for this work. But within this in-
formal process, the work programs developed are not always tied directly to
the issues before the Commission (e.g., the current joint ABAG-MTC program
which emphasizes large scale, long term planning efforts rather than shorter
term decision-oriented analytic tools) and the number of issues may make it
difficult for one person to oversee the entire process. MTC is seeking to
establish some procedures to deal with this problem. The proposed alternative
establishes a broader forum, with its own staff, to attempt to set more care-
ful work priorities.
Second, the alternative provides for a somewhat more responsive process
of work priority setting. The current process primarily provides for work
program guidance by the Commission's work program committee and it would prob-
ably be that they would maintain final priority setting control under the
alternative. The alternative strategy, however, provides for formal inputs
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from community groups and other agencies in the region, potentially broadeninq
the range of concerns and issues considered for study. Such broader inputs
also can aid in the development of more comprehensive specifications for
studies to be done, making commission members and the deputy executive direct-
or aware of community issues and implementation interdependencies which should
be considered for particular issues.
Third, the strategy encourages better coordination of MTC contacts with
other agencies and the community, hopefully providing for a common base of
information throughout MITC about intended agency actions and issues which
might be raised by communities. MTC would benefit from a more consistent
public image, from visible key liaison personnel for different interest groups
and agencies, and from better dis,semination throughout MTC of information
about what the different parts of its own staff are involved in. In addition,
attempts by MTC to encourage certain practices or policies on the part of
other agencies (e.g. through SB325 claims or project reviews) can be aided by
carefully coordinated backup analysis by the MTC staff.
Fourth, the planning activities carried on by MTC receive better coordin-
ated guidance from the higher levels of the organization and the Commission
on the development of information which is specifically aimed at providing
technical guidance to MTC decisions. In response, these groups (financial
planning, implementation planning and planning and analysis) can develop flex-
ible analytic tools and reports which are concise, clear to the community and
MTC decision makers, and which speak directly to the issues being resolved.
At the same time, this alternative approach may have several disadvant-
ages. First, it could be criticized for sacrificing work to develop analytic
capabilities for longer range planning efforts which is critical to providing
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a framework for comprehensive regional decision-making to short term efforts
to provide information to resolve immediate.issues. Federal agencies currently
require detailed efforts to develop long range planning tools. Also, MTC is
faced with the possibility12 that the local CALTRANS district would step in and
use its already developed modelling capabilities (which are strongly biased
to highway travel 13) if MTC cannot develop its own capabilities.
While MTC cannot ignore these problems, this approach suggests sacrific-
ing such efforts to develop long range techniques wherever possible to allow
for development of less expensive, easier to use analytic tools. Issues con-
tinue to arise and decisions continue to be made (e.g., adoption of the MTC
regional plan) while long range planning efforts go on. The decisions made
often are major ones which will 'shape the future of the entire region without
any reference to these long range efforts. This strategy therefore, only re-
flects an attempt to consciously incorporate comprehensive and long range con-
siderations, as well as they can be understood with limited resources of time
and analytic techniques, directly into these important decisions. As was sug-
gested in the second chapter, this sort of decision guidance may actually be the
most effective means of guiding decisions about the future, i.e., through a
sequential learning process of making informed decisions, assessing the results
of those decisions, and learning from that appraisal what other actions might
be taken.
A second criticism of this alternative strategy is that it creates a
form of 'invisible' regional government, in taking important decisions behind
closed doors within MTC. It may be more responsive to have these decisions
on work priorities (which will ultimately affect what gets done) made by the
full Commission or by a special advisory group (made up of the Commission,
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interest groups and other agencies). The attempt here was to provide a forum
to openly make those decisions in the first place (i.e. instead of the pre-
vious informal process), to develop a more responsive forum (i.e. with liaison
with the different agencies and the community) and a forum at least part of
which deals with the issues full time every day (in that both the Commission
and a special advisory group would have many other concerns and only a small
number of their members would be able to deal with the ongoing and numerous
decisions to be made on work to be done). Nonetheless, there is the danger
that such a technical forum could be viewed suspiciously and not wholly
accepted by the whole Commission or by other groups. Therefore, it would be
important to stress broader review of specific issues (i.e., explicit community
interaction strategies), documentation and wide circulation of all decisions
made by the group (i.e., the minutes of its meetings) and periodic review of
the group's activities with the entire Commission.
One final criticism is that adding this new formal layer (i.e., issue
identification and work program development) will, when implemented, only add
a new barrier to effective communication between the planning groups in MTC
and the Commission. It is difficult to tell, but this new formality, when
taken off of an organizational chart and put into the hands of people to im-
plement, may become a new piece of bureaucratic rigidity, establishing rigid
procedures for making decisions and throttling any innovation by the planning
staff.
Of course, this type of criticism cannot be fully answered prior to im-
plementation. One can examine the literature on organizational information
flow and dynamics, but it is difficult to locate an exactly comparable case.
Rather, it can be suggested that first, the alternative is attempting to
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rectify apparent rigidities in the current MTC organizational structure which
hinder internal coordination and responsiveness to a wide range of interest
groups; second, the Executive Director, in staffing this new group would need
to carefully select qualified high level personnel who are capable of working
together, of communicating with other people and of maintaining flexibility
in a more formal atmosphere; and third, the size of the group and its staff
has purposefully been kept relatively small so as to make the key actors
accessible to all levels of the organization without the need for rigid pro-
cedures.
In addition, this forum should avoid taking control of all aspects of
MTC's operation, for fear of stifling creativity on the part of MTC's staff
and bogging itself down in dealing with too many issues. The process of
identifying different categories of issues (i.e., needs Commission approval,
needs committee approval, needs staff approval) currently being developed at
MTC should help the priority setting forum to focus its efforts on major
issues.
Thus we see that the alternative strategy has several potential advan-
tages over the existing strategy in improving the sensitivity of the planning
activities at MTC to providing the types of information which are necessary
for decisions by the Commission. Its several disadvantages, while serious,
will probably not be so severe as to outweigh its advantages. Developing an
organizational strategy, of course, can only be fully accomplished if one also
has the opportunity to implement that strategy and alter it as the need arises.
In designing a strategy as has been done here, an attempt has been made to
consciously analyze existing knowledge about the political and technical
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constraints on MTC's organizational strategy, and to link that knowledge to
decisions on organizational actions by MTC, to help make the near term
decisions on organizational strategy as well-informed as possible.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION: ORGANIZING PLANNING IN ITS POLITICAL CONTEXT
The process by which a planner (or planning agency) analyzes
political issues and applies that analysis to the organization of planning
activities is dynamic and complex. Many different issues surface simultaneously
and numerous personal interactions (with the community, political actors and
other planners) shape' the planner's perspective. The diversity of issues
provides the planner with many rich opportunities to integrate political and
planning considerations. At the same time, however, the olanner's personal
involvement in ongoing political issues can limit his or her ability to step
back and assess the role which planning can and should be playing to complement
political decision-making.
.Any formal attempt to simulate this analysis process in a written
document is limited. The author has much more time to step back and reflect
upon the interrelationships between various issues and actors. Also, the
author's perspective is not being shaped by continual interactions with other
people who participate in the political decision-making process. Instead,
the author is allowed to make assumptions which are not constantly challenged
by other actors or by events and to postulate and evaluate planning strategies
without the means or the responsibility for implementing them.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the attempt to perform such
analysis here has been valuable in two ways. First, it has begun to illustrate
how and why the political context should be considered in decisions on organiz-
ing the activities of a planning agency. Second, it has identified several
potential changes in MTC's current planning activities which would help to
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create the linkage between planning knowledge and organized government
action.
Specifically, the alternative strategy developed would accomplish
three things. First, it would improve the timeliness of the information which
is developed for decision-makers by improving the mechanism by which priorities
for planning work are set and by suggesting the development of less sophisticated
and less cumbersome analysis techniques to develop information when it is
needed. Second, it would improve the comprehensiveness of the information
developed for decision-makers by establishing a more responsive forum for
setting work priorities, by attempting to provide technical assistance to
interest groups which cannot otherwise have their interests expressed and by
developing information on the long term impacts of near term decisions.
Finally, it would improve the clarity and conciseness of the information by
encouraging conscious consideration of the relationship of reporting formats
and graphics to the working style of the Commission members.
The ultimate effectiveness of this strategy will depend on the
interest of the political decision-makers on MTC in absorbing and assessing
the information developed by planners. Nonetheless, the strategy attempts
to provide analysis of the issues of most immediate concern to the political
decision-makers in a manner best suited to the interests and style of those
decision-makers. In so doing, the planner may not only create the linkage
between knowledge and action more effectively, but may also benefit from
improved credibility as an actor who can realistically assess problems and
provide useful guidance for resolving those problems.
Implications for Planning Practice
MTC is operating in a specific political and technical context.
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Within that context, the role which MTC has developed for itself (and for its
staff) is very similar to the role proposed for the planner in Chapter II.
One must ask, however, whether the type of organization strategy for Bay Area
transportation planning developed from the proposed role for planners would be
suitable in other regions, in other planning disciplines or at lower levels of
government. Even more basically, one must ask whether planning practice in
other regions and disciplines would benefit at all from the use of political
analysis to guide development of organizational strategies for planning agencies.
While full answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this
research, each of these other contexts for planning is briefly reviewed below
to suggest opportunities and constraints for applying political analysis to
organizing planning activities.
Other Metropolitan Areas - There are clear differences between the
Bay Area and other metropolitan areas. First, interest groups can be different
from those found in the Bay Area. Conservation interests may not be so active
in areas with less prominent natural resources or minority groups might be
better organized where there is only one central city. Second, issues will vary
according to the history and geographic features of each area. For example,
many areas are just now considering the development of massive rail transit
systems, and the types of decisions which are being made and the types of
planning information necessary to complement the decision process will be
different. Third, even where interest groups and issues are similar, the
decision-making dynamics will likely vary. Very few other regions have agencies
as powerful as MTC. In their place, one will often find the unstable and
ineffective COG's. In these cases, the political dynamics will vary according
to the role of the state (e.g., in states with one major city such as
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Massachusetts, the state will often be responsible for regional decisions),
and according to the role of local government [e.g., strong home rule with
many competing governments within a region (e.g., Los Angeles), strong home
rule with few competing governments (e.g., San Diego) or relatively weak
home rule (e.g., Boston or New York)]. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly,
political dynamics will vary according to the distributions of power in
different areas, with predominantly elite decision-making requiring
different planning activities from more pluralist decision-making as was
suggested in Chapter II.
Despite these differences, however, metropolitan areas tend to
exhibit one major similarity. In almost all cases, one can perceive an
"ecology of games" at work, withdifferent actors pursuing their interests
by initiating and supporting diverse private and public actions. It is this
characteristic which has stimulated most regions to develop some form of
regional decision-makinq body which can resolve conflicts between these
diverse interests when they transcend local boundaries. Although the
particular organizational strategy developed for MTC will very likely not be
appropriate in other metropolitan areas, the existence in all areas of a
political process which continually selects and resolves issues as they
emerge will necessitate the same type of political analysis as that performed
here for the Bay Area. By performing this type of analysis, planning agencies
can make adjustments in their own activities and structures to provide
timely, comprehensive information which is relevant to their particular
political context.
Other Planning Disciplines - Application of political analysis to
organizing planning activities should be valuable in planning disciplines
other than transportation. In comprehensive health planning, for example,
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regional agencies are being granted increased powers to approve applications
by local providers of health services for "certificates of need" before
facilities can be expanded. As issues arise, the agencies seek to foster
improvement and coordination of health service delivery to all groups.1
Similarly, land use and open space issues often involve particular proposed
developments which are likely to change the character of a portion of a region
(e.g., a suburban housing development on the open fringe of a metropolitan
area) rather than issues which require overall master plans. In New York City,
the nature of these issues has led to a recent emphasis on "mini-planning"
(rather than large scale master planning), aimed at resolving issues in partic-
ular portions of the city.2 In Hawaii, recognition of the need to resolve
issues as they emerge has led the state government to seek land use legisla-
tion which establishes a process for resolving land use issues rather than
requiring the development of one master land use plan. 3
Of course there are also major differences between transportation
and these other disciplines. Regional decision-making authority for transpor-
tation issues has generally been more widely established than authority over
these issues. This is due, in part, to the nature of these other issues,
where public agencies attempt to regulate private actions rather than initiate
public actions. In addition, transportation planning has developed a more
sophisticated set of analysis tools as a basis for developing planning infor-
mation. This may provide an organization like MTC with more capabilities for
providing technical guidance to political decisions than other types of re-
gional agencies.
Nonetheless, increasing concern at national and local levels with
issues such as the impacts of urban growth and sprawl, and the inefficiencies
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of the health care system is leading many regions to establish powerful
regional decision-making bodies in other disciplines. With the establishment
of such groups, the need for planning activities to provide timely, relevant
information for political decision-making will increase. As a result, exper-
ience with structuring transportation planning to complement political decision-
making should provide a useful model for the application of political analysis
to the development of organizational strategies for these new planning and
decision-making agencies.
Planning at the Local Level - Local governments normally have scarce
planning resources (particularly in smaller communities) and their ability to
resolve many issues can be limited by the larger-than-local nature of the
issues (e.g. , major transportation improvements). Nonetheless, local govern-
ment is the only authoritative level of decision-making for some issues (e.g.,
zoning and land use) and decision-making forums (e.g., city councils) have
developed much more fully at the local level. Thus, the need to use scarce
planning resources well and the need to understand constraints on local gov-
ernment's ability to resolve issues suggests that local planning agencies
should carefully consider what activities they perform and how those activities
are structured. At the same time, the existence of a well-developed political
decision process within most local governments, and the relatively long ex-
perience of these decision processes with administration and decision-making
for zoning and other regulatory actions, should facilitate rearranging the
resources of city planning agencies to complement the ongoing political deci-
sion process. Interest groups should be better developed and fewer in number
than at the regional level and regular processes by which issues emerge and
by which policies are initiated and implemented should exist. Thus, identifying
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interests which are not being considered in the decision-making processes and
points in the processes which offer opportunities for linking planning infor-
mation to decision-making should actually be easier than at the regional level.
Thus one can see that first, analysis such as that performed for MTC
can provide valuable ideas for generally improving the linkage between planning
information and governmental action, and second, that similar analysis poten-
tially can be applied to a wide range of planning activities in varying poli-
tical contexts. Such analysis will undoubtedly result in different organiza-
tional strategies in different contexts, shaped by variations in distributions
of power and decision authority, by the level of planning sophistication and
by the level of resources available for planning activities. Nonetheless, if
planners are to complement the political decision-making process by linking
their knowledge to ongoing governmental actions, they must, in any context,
understand how issues emerge, what types of issues and interest groups are
involved in resolving those issues, and what types of political dynamics guide
the resolution of those issues.
Ultimately, how well any planner can play the role of complementing
the political decision-making process will depend not only on how well he or
she analyzes a political context, but also upon the capabilities and values
of the person and that person's interest in helping the political decision-
making process make comprehensive decisions which consider the interests of
many different groups. The analysis performed here, therefore, cannot guaran-
tee that the 'planner's dilemma' will be resolved. Rather, it provides only
one step towards developing a planner's role which recognizes the limitations
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on planner's abilities and seeks, within those limitations, to mesh the
planner's processed knowledge with the personal knowledge of society's
diverse actors as those actors make decisions which shape the future.
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